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BUSINESS DECISIONS BY THE NEW BOARD:
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE AND
CORPORATE LAWt
Robert J. Haft**
Not long ago, the boards of directors of large American corporations1 generally rubber-stamped the decisions of top management.2
As lower-rank offi~rs or business associates of the corporation, most
directors were beholden to one "director," the chief executive officer.
The board rendered friendly advice to the chief executive and :fired
him if he performed very poorly.3 Almost invariably, however, the
chief executive dominated the old board. This pattern of subservience has recently begun to give way. ''Independent" or nonmanagement directors now constitute a majority of the typical board of the
1,300 largest corporations in the United States.4 Along with this independence has come an unmistakable trend toward increasing the
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1. This Article deals with only the very largest American corporations. The cut very
roughly includes companies with over $150 million in assets or $1 billion in annual sales, with
publicly traded common stock. This comprises, in the corporate statistical data later cited, no
less than the "Fortune 500," nor more than the 1,300 largest corporations. Most of the analysis
in this A!ticle is premised on the existence of a board consisting of a majority of independent
directors, which these companies have recently achieved, and part of the analysis is based
upon corporate organizations with virtually autonomous divisions, usually a function of operations which are very large in si?.e and complex. The other large- and medium-sized publicly
held corporations may not have a majority of independent directors or autonomous divisions
in the foreseeable future.
2. One president has said, ''We get a little advice from the outside board members, but the
management runs the company. The board rubber-stamps the action of the management, and
the board members are there to mollify the outside stockholders." Mace, Tlte President and tlte
Board of.Directors, HAR.v. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1972, at 37, 39. Accord, R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LAROE CoRPORATION 131 (1945) ("For the majority of the corporations studied, the available evidence strongly suggests that ratification of management
proposals by the board is largely a formality."). But see End of tlte .Directors' Rubber Stamp,
Bus. WEEK, Sept. 10, 1979, at 72 (noting a greater willingness by directors to challenge management policies).
3. See M. MAcE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY 15 (1971); Mace, supra note 2, at 3741; Mace, .Directors: Mytlt and Reality- Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293, 303-04
(1979).
4. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 1980 UPDATE 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980). This study seems to exclude from the definition
of independent directors not only full-time corporate officers, but also their family members,
retired corporate officers, lawyers and commercial or investment bankers doing business_with
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role of the new board in corporate govemance. 5
Although some evidence suggests that recent innovations
designed to strengthen the board's role6 have been more cosmetic
the corporation. Other studies citing higher percentages of outside directors do not seem to
make this distinction.
The most recent survey, conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission, finds that
the boards of the largest companies (over $150 million in assets) consist of very slightly under a
majority (48.5%) of"independent" directors, under the most stringent of definitions. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 17518, 21 SEC DOCKET 1551, 1558, at Table 2 (Feb. 17, 1981)
[hereinafter cited as SEC 1980 Study]. This stricter definition of independent directors excludes: present employees of the company and its affiliates, former employees, relatives of
executive officers, creditors, suppliers, customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, and
control persons.
5. This trend is being accelerated at the instance of traditionally powerful forces on the
corporate scene: the New York Stock Exchange, the Business Roundtable, and the American
Bar Association. See Andrews, The Roundtable Statement on Boards of.Directors, HARV. Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 24, 30; Corporate .Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW, 1591, 1625
(1978) (ABA encourages nonmanagement director majorities to effectuate independent decision-making) [hereinafter cited as Guidebook]. But see Hetherington, When the Sleeper Wakes:
Reflections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183 (1979);
Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981); Letts,
Corporate Governance: A .Dtfferent Slant, 35 Bus. LAW. 1505 (1980). In 1978, the New York
Stock Exchange required all its listed companies to create an audit committee composed of
independent directors.
6. Most of the largest corporations have audit committees of the board, with the power to
delve deeply into the company's records, methods, and practices. See note 15 infra. The
board's role is also expanding as a result of the creation of compensation committees, compose<_l of independent directors. Such committees, which exist in most of the largest corporations, fix the terms of top management compensation. KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD
OF DIRECTORS SEVENTH ANNUAL STUDY 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KORN/FERRY 1980].
About 80% of the largest corporations have a compensation committee. SEC 1980 study,supra
note 4, at Table 11. Over 88% of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange have one.
Id About 72% of the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independent"
un_der the most stringent definition. Id at Table 16. In addition, over 45% of the 1,300 largest
corporations have a director nominating committee. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra
note 4, at 3. About 45.5% of responding companies from the 1000 largest industrial companies
and 300 leading nonindustrial corporations have a nominating committee making the initial
decision approving board prospects. This is a recent and significant change, Now, the initial
decision in approving board prospects is made by the directors, not the chief executive, in 58%
of the 1300 largest companies, either through the nominating committee (45.5%) or by all
directors as a group (12.7%). Id Over 75% of the very largest corporations (at least $2 billion
in sales) make the initial decision in the nominating committee (69.2%) or the decision is made
by all directors (6.4%). Id The initial decision is made by the chief executive in 26.6% of all
1300 companies and in 16.7% of the very largest companies. Id
A more recent survey indicates that about 40% of the largest companies (over $150 million
in assets) have a nominating committee. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 18. Almost
49% of the largest companies which are listed on the New York Stock Exchange have one. Id.
About two-thirds of the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independent" under the most stringent definition. Id Almost all (97.4%) nominating committees "select or recommend nominees" for the board, but only 12.7% "evaluate incumbent directors."
Id at Table 21. See KORN/FERRY INTERNATIONAL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS EIGHTH ANNUAL
STUDY 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KORN/FERRY 1981] (52% of the responding 576 large
corporations have a nominating committee and another 8% are considering establishing one).
Most of the largest corporations have board audit committees empowered to delve deeply
into the company's records, methods and practices. Boulton, The Evolving Board· A Look at
the Board's Changing Roles and Information Needs, 3 ACAD. MOT. REV. 827, 828 (1978) (discussing effects of increasingly active audit committees). Over 95% of the largest companies
(over $150 million in assets) have an audit committee, including virtually all companies listed
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than real,7 it is clear that the new board will become an important
locus of corporate power in the near future. Substantive effects usually lag behind structural changes, and these changes are all relatively recent. In fact, 1980 may have been the watershed year.
Nearly half (48.5%) of the directors of companies with over $150
million in assets were persons "independent" of management in a
rigorous sense. These "independent" directors were not present or
former officers, employees, relatives of officers, creditors, suppliers,
customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, or control stockholders of the company. 8 In other words, the new breed of director
has no economic stake in the company, other than the relatively
modest compensation associated with the directorship. And since
1980, the board, and not the chief executive, has made the initial
decision approving nominees for election as directors in almost seventy percent of the very largest corporations ($2 billion sales) and in
over fifty-eight percent of the 1,300 largest companies.9 Nearly
eighty percent of the 1,300 largest companies recently stated that the
board will exert more influence, 10 and the momentum generated by
recent pressures to reform corporate governance will undoubtedly
continue.
The board that is emerging in the large corporations to fill this
more influential role is a peer group - a collegial body of equals in
the critical sense that one (the chief executive) does not wield special
power over the others. The independent directors will naturally give
weight to the chief executive's views, based on the latter's special"
knowledge and experience, but this is qualitatively different than the
domination of the old board by the chief executive. This new equality among board members will be reinforced by the rough equality
in socioeconomic status that has always existed on boards of direcon the New York Stock Exchange. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 11. About 82% of
the members of this committee in the largest companies are "independent" under the most
stringent definition. Id at Table 17. Of these committees, about 75.4% review the adequacy of
the corporation's internal controls, but only 9% direct internal corporate investigations. Id at
Table 20. See Burns, On the Rationale of the Corporate System, in THE CORPORATE SOCIETY
121, 174 (R. Marris ed. 1974).
.

1. See Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board
Promise?, 16 MICH. L. REV. 581, 590-601 (1978).

of Directors:

Fond Hope -

Faint

8. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Table 2.
9. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3.
10. In a recent survey, nearly 80% of the 1300 largest companies believe boards will exert
more influence on corporate governance in the future. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra
note 4, at 1. Certain business commentators envision boards of directors playing a much more
significant role in strategic planning for the company. See, e.g., Wommack, The Board's Most
Important Function, HARV. Bus. REv., Sept-Oct. 1979, at 48.

4

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:1

tors. 11 To discharge its new responsibilities, the new board will be
more active, primarily through committees of the board, than the old
board. Already the board and its committees are meeting more
often. Directors are working harder, both in terms of preparatory
homework and time spent at meetings, 12 and are receiving greater
compensation. 13 This trend toward more work and higher compensation will likely continue, and boards may shrink in size to become
optimal work groups (with the shirkers or those with too many directorships resigning), or boards may divide progressively more work
among their various committees. 14
It is unclear, however, whether the board's functions will increase
beyond "monitoring" the performance of management, proffering
advice to the chief executive when requested, and considering management's business proposals. Commentators agree that today the
board does no more than this. Although time and informational
constraints will continue to prevent the board from managing or actually supervising the corporation's business, its new-found independence should result in more careful and skeptical consideration of
management's business proposals than in the past. And the independent directors will demand, and receive, more information relevant to important corporate matters. 15
These emerging trends are consistent with the view, currently
supported by the commentators and the corporate establishment,
that directors should be "monitors." 16 They are also consistent with
viewing directors as "deciders." This Article's thesis is that, by rea11. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 3, Table 3. The independent directors are drawn ,
from the upper ranks of other companies, academia, the bar, commercial and investment
banking, and the government.
12. The boards of the largest companies (over $150 million in assets) meet 8.6 times per
year. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Tables 2 & 8. About one-third have 9 to 12 board
meetings per year. Id at 1553. In addition, the audit, compensation, and nominating committees of these companies meet, respectively, 3.2, 3.3, and 2.2 times per year. Id at Table 12.
Further, the SEC observes that "there is evidence that some boards are becoming more active." Id See KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8. See generally ARTHUR YOUNG EXECU·
TIVE REsOURCE CONSULTANTS, THE NEW DIRECTOR 28-29 (1981) [hereinafter cited as THE
NEW DIRECTOR] (board meetings may be decreasing from an average of 10 to 14 meetings per
year in 1967 to six to eight meetings in 1979, but the use of committees is increasing
significantly).
13. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 5-8 (aggregate and average fees have increased,
but fee per hour of work has decreased); SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at 1533.
14. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 4 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977]. But see KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 3 ("For the seventh consecutive year, the average number of directors • • • is 13.").
15. Boulton, supra note 6, at 835; HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 10.
16. SEC, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY,printedfor tire use ef SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 549-53 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
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son of its recently secured independence from management domination, the boards of directors of large American corporations are now
in a unique position to make business decisions of the highest quality, 17 and that corporate law should respond to this potential appropriately. On the basis of findings in the behavioral sciences, this
Article urges a limited rethinking of the role of the chief executive
and the board of directors before the model of directors as
"monitors" of the chief executive's performance is frozen in place.
Already armed with information supposedly received as monitors,
the independent director group can best employ its limited time by
doing what corporate law used to command (and still strongly suggests): making business decisions.
There is growing recognition by the corporate establishment ,in
America that its priorities should be reordered to achieve profit maximization in the long-term rather than in the short-term. The recent
stress on financial wizardry and short-term profit may well shift to
an emphasis on manufacturing superior products at prices competitive with other nations and on making long-term investments for real
productivity gains. 18 The new board js uniquely equipped to make
17. "High-quality decisions" is not a loaded phrase for some hidden social or political
agenda. This Article simply assumes that an objective standard of excellence exists for business decisions and focuses upon the traditionally important decisions of corporate life: markets, acquisitions, major corporate goals, and strategic planning, all for profit maximization.
One could apply the approach just as consistently to social responsibility or any other goal,
provided the peer decision-making group agrees upon the relevant common values and
objectives.
18. Reginald H. Jones, the recently retired charman of General Electric and Chairman of
the Business Council, took this position in a recent interview in the Washington Post:
The biggest problem in American business today, Jones said, is the sharp decline in
the :1uality ofU.S.-produced goods, a factor he attributes largely to a "management-malaise' that he says has permeated corporate suites in recent years and inhibited executives
from taking steps to stay ahead.
The only hope for correcting it: Revamp the thinking in corporate boardrooms, Jones
says, so directors and stockholders recognize they sometimes must forgo short-term profits
to make the kinds of needed investments that will "enhance the long-range opportunities
of the corporation."
"What we have today," Jones says, "is a bunch of money managers who are under
tremendous pressure from Wall Street to have every quarter a little bit better than the last,
and I'm not sure it's realistic." If you're going to make long-term improvements, he asserts, profits occasionally may have to slip.
Jones complains bitterly that this profits-at-any-price quest has brought on a spate of
illnesses in American business - not only the decline in quality, but a falloff in productivity, a slump in.corporate investment and a lag in research and development.
How do you tum that around? "To me, that puts the onus squarely on the board of
directors," Jones says. Corporate directors must "encourage management to make investments that will enhance" longer-range opportunities - even if they mean some diminution of profitability in the short run.
In Corporate Leadership, An Era Ends at G.E. Co., Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 1981, § H, at 1, col 1,
7, col. 3. See also Hayes & Abernathy, Managing our way to economic decline, HARV. Bus.
REV., July-Aug. 1980, at 67.
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these decisions. Neither time nor informational constraints should
foreclose such decisions from board purview. The difference between directors as monitors or deciders is one of degree or emphasis.
But like gender, the difference could become dramatic.
In Part I, this Article summarizes the empirical research that
compares the decision-making capabilities of peer groups such as the
new board with those of individuals and other groups. All other
things being equal, the new board will make better decisions than
the individuals and groups within the corporation who have a more
direct stake in its short-term profitability. Part II suggests some legal
responses to these findings. It argues primarily that the law should
encourage truly independent directors to serve and act not merely as
"monitors," but rather as "deciders." To promote these ends, courts
can accord more certain, and probably greater, legal protection to
business decisions reached by the truly independent board than does
current law. This can be effected by the courts under the business
judgment rule. Part II concludes with a brief discussion of certain
legal rules and corporate governance "reform" proposals that may
create inequalities of power among the directors, and thus undermine quality decision-making.
A number of other factors, discussed in Part Ill, may also affect
the quality of peer group decision-making. For example, the behavioral sciences, particularly the small group literature, suggest that
"cohesiveness," friendship, and trust among group members - as
well as common values and objectives - promote better group performance. The first section of Part III thus considers various governance proposals that threaten group cohesiveness. It then examines
the extent to which corporate law should distinguish among directors
for liability purposes, and urges that courts refrain from ipdividualizing the scope of directorial duty unless a particular director's conduct is fraudulent or illegal.
The second section of Part Ill analyzes other conditions that promote high quality decisions. Small group researchers suggest that
the proper group size for optimal decision-making is five, supporting
the typical thirteen-person board that divides decision-making tasks
among smaller committees. Other behavioral scientists have found
that a "consensus" decision rule results in better group decisions
than does a majority rule. Corporate law should respond
appropriately.
Part Ill's final section confirms that peer group decision-making
is not a panacea. Unless counteracted, the natural group pressures
promoting conformity and a rush to decide will undermine quality
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decisions. The empirical findings suggest certain procedural steps
that the new board can take to ameliorate "groupthink" tendencies.
Certain of these procedures-e.g., separating the roles of chief executive and chairperson of the board or assigning a different director at
each meeting to serve as a formal devil's advocate - have received
substantial evidential support. The courts can provide incentives to
adopt one or more of these procedures by affording additional legal
protections to the decisions of an independent board that has such a
procedure in place.
Part IV takes up the thorniest subject - the proper allocation of
decision-making between the chief executive and the n,ew board in
the large corporation. Social psychologists have found that peer
groups make better decisions than do individuals, whose limited cognitive capacities lead to more systematic errors in decision-making
than was previously supposed. These findings suggest that the board
should make more of the decisions currently made by the individual
chief executive. Time constraints demand that most major decisions
be made by the chief executive, either alone or in consultation with
subordinates. But, the Article argues, the board, and not the chief
executive, should formulate long-term and strategic plans, 19 make
decisions affecting the entire organization, and choose between stark
alternatives. Peer group decision-making by the new board will be
better in such cases than decisions by the chief executive.
Recognizing that these changes may not occur without some judicial prodding, Part IV suggests several legal approaches to the division of decision-making between the chief executive and the new
board. By extending the protection of the business judgment rule,
courts can encourage the board to decide more and delegate less to
the chief executive. Similarly, by denying business judgment protection and revitalizing agency principles, they can discourage the chief
executive from making business decisions that should be left to the
board.
At the same time, corporate law should eliminate any suggestion
that independent directors must conduct their own investigations
into corporate activities. "Monitoring," in the investigative sense,
should be the duty of the chief executive and responsible senior executives, not the new board. The courts should utilize agency princi19. See Shanklin & Ryans, Inside/Outside Director Ieformation Needs: A Survey, DIREC& BOARDS, Winter 1981, at 22-25; Wommack, supra note 10, at 48 (board's "most important function is to approve or send back . . . management's recommendations about the future
direction of the corporation"). Cf. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 11 (noting
that two-thirds of the board chairmen surveyed considered input on long-term planning to be
the board's most important function).
TORS
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ples or the business judgment rule to encourage the chief executive
to pierce the pervasive informational blockages in the huge organization, and report to the board the information that is critical to its
decisions. In the process, the chief executive will also acquire more
accurate information in the decision areas that the board has explicitly delegated to him.
1.
A.

THE FINDINGS OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES

Can the Behavioral Sciences Supply "Empirical" Findings?

Many persons perceive the behavioral sciences, particularly psychology and social psychology, as "soft" - too general and vague to
be put to practical use, and too new to be given weight in daily affairs.20 They are naturally skeptical of "empirical" findings that are
based on laboratory experiments conducted by a professor, with his
or her students as subjects. Two methodological problems may justify this natural skepticism. First, it is not clear that college students
are representative of the population at large.21 Second, these findings may be distorted by the "experimenter expectancy effect,"
which occurs when the professor unconsciously gets his students to
do what he wants them to do and then reports their actions as empirical findings. 22
Behavioral scientists, however, are increasingly using the methodologies of the natural sciences to measure the variables in human
behavior. Many of the findings summarized in this Article were first
made in controlled laboratory studies and later confirmed by field
observations in natural settings.23 Recent experimental designs have
also sought to eliminate the experimenter expectancy effect. And, as
some recent findings in cognitive psychology suggest, it is our muchprized individual intuition that may be "soft" and unreliable. 24
20. See Miller, Hard Realities and.Soft Social Science, PUB. INTEREST., Spring 1980, at 67.
21. Miner,A Comparative Analysis ofThree Diverse Group Decision Making Approaches, 22
ACAD. MGT. J. 81, 90 (1979) (quoting McNemar, Opinion Altitude Methodology, 43 PSYCH.
BULL. 289, 333 (1946)) (''the existing science of human behavior is largely the science of the
behavior of [college) sophomores").
A classic and incisive analysis of directors' behavior under various legal rules was provided
by Professor Alfred F. Conard, and, happily, without reliance on findings concerning college
sophomores. See Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability far Negligence, 1972
DUKE LJ. 895.
22. R. ROSENTHAL, EXPERIMENTER EFFECTS IN BEHAVIORAL REsEARCH 127-40 (1966).
See Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Principles and Social Science
Theory, 64 VA. L. REv. 1123, 1153-54 (1978).
23. Cf. M. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS 428-36 (3d ed. 1981) (noting that field observations
have confirmed a number of laboratory findings concerning group behavior).
24. See notes 208-22 infra and accompanying text
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A vast body of literature exists on group decision-making. Wellknown psychologists, political scientists, social psychologists, economists, sociologists, and others have contributed to the field. The empirical evidence strongly supports the proposition that, all other
things being equal, decisions_ made by a peer group are qualitatively
better than those of an individual or of a group of nonpeers.

B. Peer Groups Make Better Decisions Than Do Individuals
The evidence shows that peer groups produce better solutions to
problems than d9 individuals working alone. With some dissent, the
evidence also supports the proposition that peer groups perform better than the best individual in the group. This is the "assembly bonus effect." Intellectual synergy apparently occurs in peer groups.
The types of problems used in the many experiments vary
greatly.25 The studies are, however, sufficiently similar to indicate
that group superiority obtains when the contributions of several individuals can be combined, when decisions require the creation of
ideas and recall of information, and when group members are permitted to correct individual errors.26 Theories advanced to explain ·
group superiority include the influence and ability of the best or
most confident group member and the greater individual interest in
the problem that participation in group decision-making arouses. 27
Groups also correct errors of fact or of judgment that are randomly
distributed among their members. 28 Obviously, groups expend more
person-hours than individuals,29 but the potential benefits from
high-quality decisions at the top level of the largest corporations
overwhelmingly outweigh the extent to which costs of director-group
decisions exceed the costs of decisions by individual chief
executives.30
The earliest studies involved simple tasks with one correct solution, and groups clearly outperformed individuals. 31 Later, in 1959,
25. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 60-64.
26. Id at 78.
27. Id at 64.
28. See id at 57-62, 77-78.
29. Id at 78.
30. The "costs" referred to are the dollar costs of the corporation and the opportunity costs
of the directors. If opportunity costs become too high because too much work is demanded
from them, the directors will simply quit. Thus, the corporation faces an upper limit on the
amount of decision-making it can demand from the new board.
31. For example, Thorndike in 1938 found that, in experiments involving 56 Barnard students, groups were superior to individuals in problems involving sentence completion, limericks, and crossword puzzles. Thorndike concluded that groups are superior when dealing
with materials ''permitting a greater range of response." Thorndike, On Wltat Type of Task
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Barnlund reported evidence of group superiority in logical problem
solving.32 He compared the performances of individuals working
alone and as members of decision groups, recording and analyzing
the discussions of over 170 college students making 829 decisions.
Only two of the twenty-nine groups failed to outperform their own
best member. In both of these groups, an individual had received an
almost perfect initial score. Barnlund concluded that the superior
group results reflected the dynamics of the group itself, which led to
greater concentration on the problem, more enthusiasm, stimulation
of more careful thinking, consideration of a wider range of ideas,
and critical testing of ideas through discussion. 33
More recent experimental designs evince a high degree of scientific sophistication and use advanced statistical techniques to evaluate both the design and the results. For example, Felsenthal and
Fuchs presented individuals and groups with a complex problem involving over twenty variables and having only one correct answer.
The results corroborate the proposition that groups are superior to
individuals in complex problem solving.34 Other recent experiments
reported by Hall and Watson35 and by NemirofP 6 evaluated complex decisions made under conditions of high uncertainty - the context of most major business decisions. Both used the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration's Moon Survival Problem.
Subjects ranked fifteen items of equipment in order of their importance for survival, making fifteen interdependent judgments. All
subjects first ranked the fifteen items on their own, and then joined
groups. The experimenters instructed certain groups to tolerate diWill a Group do Well?, 33 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 409,413 (1938). Similarly, Taylor and
Faust in 1952 found that groups performed significantly better than individuals in playing the
game of Twenty Questions. Taylor & Faust, Twenty Questions: Efficiency in Problem Solving
as a Function of Size of Group, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 360, 367 (1952). They found
superiority in terms of fewer questions posed, fewer number of failures, and shorter elapsed
time to solution. In the experiment, 105 psychology students participated. Thirty small groups
were compared to fifteen individuals over a period of five days of testing. Id. at 361. The
game is an example of a problem involving broad and imaginative search leading to one specific solution.
32. Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority, and Group Judgment, 58 J,
ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 55, 56 (1959).
33. Id. at 59-60.
34. Felsenthal & Fuchs, Experimental Evaluation of Five Designs of Redundant Organizational Systems, 21 Ao. Sci. Q. 474,485 (1976) (reporting on experiments involving 1,674 thirdyear college students).
35. Hall & Watson, The Effects ofa Normative Intervention on Group Decision-Making Performance, 23 HUMAN REL. 299 (1970) (reporting on experiments involving 148 businesspersons attending various management seminars).
36. P. Nemiroff, Group Decision-Making Performance as Influenced by Consensus and
Self-Orientation (Oct. 1973) (unpublished graduate paper on file with the Michigan Law
Review).
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verse opinions and attempt to reach a consensus. Other groups were
given no instructions. Hall and Watson's sixteen instructed groups
outperformed their most proficient member, while the sixteen uninstructed groups performed as well as their most proficient member
and better than the average individual in the group. 37 Nemiroffreplicated Hall and Watson's experiment, and obtained nearly the same
results. 38
Empirical studies have consistently indicated that peer groups
outperform individuals in complex problem solving. Only one major summary registered a partial dissent. Olmstead and Hare agree
that groups generate more correct solutions, make fewer errors, detect errors more quickly than individuals and are "usually better at
solving problems than the average individual" in the group. They
concluded, however, that groups are "seldom better than the best
individual."39
In all important aspects, the peer group superiority findings apply to the new board. Independent directors now comprise the majority of a collegial body of equals at the apex of the corporate
hierarchy. These independent directors, unlike the chief executive
and the various vice presidents and middle-level managers, have no
direct stake in the year-to-year fluctuations in the corporation's profits. Their annual directors' compensation is not geared to short-term
results. In the very largest corporations, directors typically receive
flat annual compensation plus a fixed per-meeting fee, resulting in
noncontingent compensation ranging from $18,000 to $22,000 per
annum.4° Compensation at this level does not give the typical independent director a significant economic stake in the company because these highly qualified persons could earn more for the
directorial time and effort expended (and with lesser potential liability) in their principal or related occupations.41 The potential for
37. Hall & Watson, supra note 35, at 300-01.
38. P. Nemiroff, supra note 36, at 8, 22.
39. M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, THE SMALL GROUP 86 (2d ed. 1978). They further state:
[R]esearch has revealed no unambiguous rules for constructing creative groups. . . . Executives responsible for establishing the methods of decision-making and problem-solving
for their organizations may be able to acquire insights and wisdom from small-group
research, but as yet there is a dearth of applicable and at the same time adequately
grounded and reliable findings.
Id at 86.
40. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 14. The SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at Tables
8, 9, 10 & 12, indicates a lower range of compensation, but the KORN/FERRY data is not on a
basis comparable to the SEC data.
41. The "hourly rate" averages $119. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8.
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high-quality decision-making in the large corporation thus exists in
the new board.
C.

Other Decision-Making Groups: Uneven Decision Quality

The new board is in a unique position to make decisions guided
solely by the qualitative standard of excellence in furthering corporate goals. In contrast to the new board, the chief executive, other
high officers, and middle-level managers of the largest corporations
earn extremely large salaries, and many receive contingent compensation of hundreds of thousands of dollars (and more for some chief
executives) based upon the bottom-line profit in the particular year.
Given such high individual stakes, the vice-presidents group, the
managers of the various autonomous divisions of the large corporation, and some other decision-making peer groups below them tend
to make decisions based more upon individual security and advancement than upon qualitative excellence.42 Short-term solutions, coalition bargaining among divisional managers, "political"
acceptability, "muddling through," "satisficing," and "log rolling"
are endemic ·to decision-making by these peer groups because of
their large and direct stakes in the short-term operations of the organization.43 Whether their particular decisions also meet objective
criteria of excellence depends primarily on chance. The previously
summarized findings of peer group superiority do not apply to these
groups.
Until recently, the chief executive, the various vice presidents, retained counsel, and others beholden to the chief executive comprised
42. See generally P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 147-75 (1954); Hayes,
The Real Story on Group Executives, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 1980, at 11, 11-16; Vance,
Shared ChiefExecutive Authority: Chaos or Collegiality?, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Fall 1980, at
5 (chief executive authority sharing by a small group in major companies is on the rise again).
But see Greyhound Taps Batastini as President, Revives Executive Office After 5 1/2 Years, Wall

St. J., Nov. 21, 1980, at 8, col. 2 (reporting on the formation of a chief executive "group," but
not peers).
43. See, e.g., R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (1963); D.
KATZ & R. KAHN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 1978); J. MARCH &
H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 47-52 (1958); J. STEINBRUNER, THE CYBERNETIC THEORY OF DE•
CISION 62, 74-75 (1974); Carter, The Behavioral Theory of the Firm and Top-Level Corporate
.Decisions, 16 AD. Sci. Q. 413,421 (1971); Gamson,A Theory of Coalition Formation, in SMALL
GROUPS 562 (A. Hare, E. Borgatta & R. Bales eds. rev. ed. 1965); Johnson, Conflict Avoidance
Through Acceptable .Decisions, 21 HUMAN REL. 71, 81 (1974) (top management makes the
"second best decision" in order to increase certainty and reduce interpersonal friction); Mayhew & Levinger, On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction, 81 AM. J. Soc. 1017,
1040-41 (1976); Pfeffer, Power and Resource Allocation in Organizations, in PsYCHOLOOICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 278, 281-82 (B. Staw ed. 1977); Suedfeld,
Characteristics of .Decision Making as a Function of the Environment, in MANAGERIAL CON·
. TROL AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY 203, 209 (1978); Zaleznik, Power and Politics In
Organizational L!fe, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1970, at 47.
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a majority of the directors of most of the largest companies. The
chief executive dominated the board, whose decision-making qualitatively resembled individual decision-making by the chief executive. Similarly, "group" decision-making sessions in large
corporations today often do not involve peer groups because the participants rarely occupy the same positions in the hierarchy. As Richard Hoffman has stated:
The social systems in which the group is embedded impinge on its
functioning. The authority relationships deriving from the formal organization structure seem most powerful. People with higher organizational ranks tend to participate more actively and to exercise undue
influence in the group. These tendencies arC?, unfortunately, unrelated
to the likelihood of their having the appropriate resources to solve the
problem under consideration. The traditional stereotype that leaders
control the decision process is held even by college students, with
harmful effects on the problem-solving effectiveness of groups in our
laboratory studies. The typical organizational reward system promotes
this dependence on the leader's influence.44

Argyris and Schon make the same point in a different way when they
observe that "[top management] sessions are rarely classifiable as
problem-solving sessions."45
The limited evidence available also indicates that subordinates
distort information when reporting to their superiors. Unless the
subordinates trust their superior, they may say what they think the
superior wants to hear.46 The superior-subordinate relationship may
similarly prejudice group ''voting" on decisions. The pressure upon
the subordinates in a group to conform to what they anticipate their
superiors want is very strong.47 Its pervasive presence in the corporate sector cannot be doubted, given the rewards that conformity of44. Hoffman,Appifing Experimental Research on Group Problem Solving to Organizations,
15 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Sci. 375, 380 (1979) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 375 (citations omitted).
46. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETs AND HIERARCHIES 122-23 (1975); A. ZANDER,
GROUPS AT WORK 28 (1977); Hoffman, supra note 44, at 387; Newman & Sussman, Controlling
the Sycophant: Policies and Techniques of Corporation Presidents, ADV. MoT. J., Aug. 1978, at
14-15. q: Driscoll, Trust and Participation in Organizational .Decisio{I Making as Predictors of
Satisfaction, 21 AcAD. MOT. J. 44, 44 (1978) (trust is defined as ''the belief that decision makers will produce outcomes favorable to the person's interests without any influence by the
person"). An experienced chief executive or other superior will "discount" or "counter-bias"
information from subordinates. A good chief executive usually knows when the marketing
executives are exaggerating projected sales or when they are doing the opposite (so as to claim
credit at year-end for "increased" sales). However; a counter-biasing chief executive probably
will not learn the true state of facts. He may not, for example, learn the sales figure that the
marketing executives or even the sales people on the spot really believe will be achieved. See
Jablin & Sussman, Sycophancy in the Boardroom: Causes and Controls, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 1980, at 40, 45. In contrast, communication in a peer group is very efficient.
0. WILLIAMSON, supra, at 46-47.

41. See note 46 supra.
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fers and the authoritarian-hierarchical traditions in most large
corporations.48 The quality of decisions made by such nonpeer
groups is probably quite uneven, determined primarily by the quality of the individual superior's decision.
II. THE ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW IN PROMOTING PEER GROUP
DECISION-MAKING

The behavioral- sciences point to the new board as the best hope
for high-quality major decisions in the large corporation. The courts
can and should encourage the trend toward independent and more
active, boards. by providing nearly absolute protection under the
business judgment rule for the decisions made by a board or committee composed of a majority of independent directors. All business decisions by the independent directors should be insulated from
attack in shareholder's derivative suits, save for (1) utterly gross mistakes of judgment that were patently obvious at the time of decision
and resulted in very substantial and tangible damage to the corporation, and (2) those limited categories of decisions that directly and
personally affect the fate of their codirectors, such as the decision to
terminate a shareholder suit against codirectors.49 Articulation of
the rule in these terms (except for the second proviso) would afford
greater and more certain legal protection to the decisions of independent directors than present case law. And, there appears to be
a process-of-decision proviso to the business judgment rule, requiring due care or ordinary diligence by the directors. As argued later,
this proviso should be eliminated or strongly diluted. 50
A rule that clearly articulated almost absolute protection for
business decisions made by the new board might well increase, well
beyond a bare majority, the number of independent directors on the
new board. It may also encourage the chief executive to pass to the
board certain important decisions that the chief executive previously
made alone or in nonpeer group settings. Since the findings of the
behavioral sciences indicate that, all other things being equal, peer
48. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 399; A. ZALEZNIK & M. KETS DE VRIES, POWER AND
THE CORPORATE MIND 254 (1975); Argyris, The CEO's Behavior: Key lo Organizational Development, HARV. Bus. R.Ev., Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 55, 56.
49. The co-director exception raises wholly different behavioral issues because the cohesive
peer group is asked to judge the conduct of one of its members. The derivative suit dismissal
rule is the subject of many recent articles, most of which question the objectivity of judgments
by directors of their codirectors. See Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival oJ the Derivative Suit:
An Evaluation and a Proposalfar Legislative Reform, 81 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 261 (1981), and the
articles cited therein at 263 n. 13.
50. See text at notes 171-200 infra.
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groups outperform. both individuals, who may have severely limited
cognitive capacities,51 and nonpeer groups, whose decisions are uneven in quality, these by-products will be beneficial.

A. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule supposedly protects directors from
liability for their mistaken business decisions, absent fraud or selfdealing. A commentator has summarized the rule as follows:
'

I

Whether or not there is a specific statutory standard courts have
widely applied the business-judgment rule to shield directors against
allegations of ordinary negligence absent specific wrongful action by
them. A court, it is said, will not substitute its judgment'·for 'that of
directors when they act reasonably and in good faith. In the absence of
self-dealing, therefore, if a decision of a board of directors can be attributed to "any rational business purpose," a court will not hold a
director liable for honest errors or mistakes of judgment.52

A number of policies underlie this rule, including encouraging qualified persons to serve as directors, minimizing judicial interference to
permit private business enterprises to function at maximum efficiency, freeing directors to take business risks without inordinate
caution, and avoiding the imposition of unfair liabilities by judges
and juries who lack competence to evaluate complex business decisions and gain their wisdom by hindsight. 53 A tenet of free enterprise - the market can efficiently punish corporations for the
negative outcomes of honest but erroneous decisions - also supports
this rule.
Although judicial articulations of the rule appear clear and certain, commentators disagree about the scope of a process-of-decision
proviso and the actual standard applied by courts to the business
decision itself.54 One group sees little court intervention, except for
51. See notes 208-22 infra and accompanying text.
52. Caplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibilities: A Program far the Exercise ofDue
Care, l J. CORP. L. 57, 59-60 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
53. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630-31, 393 N:E.2d 994, 1002, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
54. One commentator has noted that the statutory expression of a standard of conduct is
less significant than its subsequent application by the judiciary. Lewis, The Business Judgment
Rule and Corporate Directors' Liability for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157, 162
(1970). The courts disagree on what the standard of conduct is because "duty" is a potentially
dynamic concept offering an opportunity for judicial sensitivity to practices as they develop.
See Mundheim, A Time lo Learn, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GovERNANCE 179, 181 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COMMENTARIES]. Certain commentators argue that the duty of care whicl). the courts impose on a director under the business
judgment rule is a much lower standard than that of an ordinary prudent person. See Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 680-81 (1974);
Kaplan, Fair Treatment of Shareholders, in COMMENTARIES, supra, at 215, 221°22. Critics
further point out that this lower standard may be a product of courts too often limiting their
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the most extreme cases. Professor Bishop has articulated this view:
The search for cases in which directors of industrial corporations
have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated
by self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very
large haystack.
. . . All in all, I remain very skeptical of the proposition that directors of industrial corporations run any substantial risk of liability for
ordinary negligence.55

Samuel Arsht, on the other hand, recently concluded that the potential for court intervention is high and that the rule does not bar liability for ordinary negligence. 56 The leading corporate texts and
most decided cases also talk of directorial liability for ordinary negligence.57 Cases actually holding directors liable for want of ordinary
care are few'or nonexistent,58 but most derivative suits against directors are settled before judgment. The threatened ordinary care standard may be a principal reason for such settlements.
One can reasonably conclude that a capable and independent director today makes business decisions only with some trepidation.
Whether that director will confront the relatively safe insanity standard ("any rational business purpose"), or a gross negligence (recklessness) standard, or an "ordinary negligence" standard for business
decisions or the process leading up to them is uncertain.
inquiry to the question of whether fraud or conflict of interest is present. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971). Other commentators assert that ordinary negligence is the standard, and, further, that a duty of inquiry is a prerequisite to the use of the
business judgment rule. See, e.g., 3A
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1040 (1975 & Supp. 1980); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Rev/siled, 8
HOFSTRA L. Rev. 93, 100 (1979); Guidebook, supra note 5, at 1602. Cf. Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct Under Common Law, Present .Day Statutes and the Model Act, 27 Bus. LAW.
61, 70 (Spec. Issue Feb. 1972) ("I believe that the distinction between the business judgment
rule and the negligence rule .•• which is already somewhat obscure, will largely vanish.").

w.

55. Bishop, Sitting .Ducks and .Decoy .Ducks: New Trends in Indemn!ftcation of Corporate
.Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078, 1099-101 (1968).
56. Arsht argues that the cases in which the business judgment defense was denied as a
result of gross negligence are consistent with those cases using a "mere negligence" standard of
care. Arsht, supra note 54, at 100-11; Arsht & Hinsey, Cod!fted Standard- Sofe Harbor Bui
Charted Channel· A Response, 35 Bus. LAW ix, xiv (1980).
57. FLETCHER, supra note 54, § 1029, at 12 ("[I]t is now the general rule that want of
ordinary care creates liability.") (footnote omitted); H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS§ 234, at 453-55 (2d ed. 1970); N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS§ 78,
at 274 (2d ed. 1971); Cf. H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS§ 63, at 158-59 (rev.
ed. 1946) ("The degree of negligence depends upon what degree of care and diligence is due
and owing, whether slight, ordinary or great.").
58. Professor Bishop found only four cases of apparent negligence uncomplicated by selfdealing, none of which, he concluded, carried "real conviction." Bishop, supra note 55, at
1099-100.
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B. Truly Independent Directors Should Be Given
Incentives To Serve

The courts can use the ambiguities in the business judgment rule
to promote decision-making by independent directors: the "any rational" basis test or a gross negligence "plus more" standard clearly articulated - would apply to business decisions reached by a
board or committee with a majority of truly independ_ent, directors,
while the standard applicable to the management-dominateg. board,
and possibly to the nonindependent directors on the new board,
could properly remain unsettled.
The principle supporting such manipulation of an arg.bigµous legal rule can be traced to the seminal case of Barnes v. Andrews, in
which Judge Learned Hand stated: "No men of sense would take
the office, if the law imposed upon them a guaranty of the general
success of their companies as a penalty for any negligence." 59 This
incentive-to-serve rationale, articulated in 1924 in Barnes, had little
meaning then for most directors of large companies. Their incentive
to serve was the pure profit motive, either as highly paid managers of
the company or as persons doing business with it. The incentive rationale was as hollow to them as it is for nonindependent directors,
who serve for the same reasons today. Courts need not grant nearly
absolute protection for decisional outcomes to these individuals.
In contrast, truly independent persons would respond to greater
and more certain protection under the business judgment rule by
more readily accepting invitations to serve as directors. Although
the "real" reasons that independent directors serve today are unclear, the pat answers - money, power, perquisites, and prestige are unsatisfactory. Generally, the individuals who have accepted
(and will in the future accept) the role have already reached the socioeconomic apex, with all the accoutrements. That their "margin"
for acceptance is their desire for still more of these goods is unpersuasive,60 especially if one considers the increasing demands on independent directors to work harder, and their positive responses
thereto.61 It seems unlikely, therefore, that independent directors
59. 298 F. 614,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). "If the test of negligence which is applicable in the
field of torts or in the Estate field were similarly applicable in the business or banking field, it
would realistically be very difficult if not almost impossible to secure the services of able and
experienced corporate directors." Smith v. Brown-Borhek Co., 414 Pa. 325,333,200 A.2d 398,
401 (1964) (emphasis in original).
60. See generally C. ALDERFER, EXISTENCE, RELATEDNESS AND GROWTH (1972); A. MAsLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (2d ed. 1970); D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVEMENT
MOTIVE (1976); D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (1961).
61. See text at notes l2-14supra.
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view the job as a mere sinecure to be favorably added in the "margin" favoring acceptance.
Some of the pat answers may figure into the mix, but "highachievement" independent directors may accept the role principally
to satisfy their individual need for new and challenging experiences62 in a pleasant interpersonal atmosphere. If this speculation
or anything close to it is the true margin of decision today, then
stringent liability rules for truly independent directors could tilt the
margin against· choosing to serve.63
The incentive to serve rationale, then, affords a principled basis
for distingu~shing between the civil liability standards applicable to
truly independent directors and the other directors. Or, the courts
could apply the same highly protective standard to all directors, but
distinguish the respective burdens of proof. 64 Whether the courts
should make any distinction depends upon other factors, some of
which will be discussed later in connection with group cohesiveness.65 To promote director independence, it may be best to leave
the negative implication of strong protection for the independent directors an open question. Courts should understand, however, that
testing the business decisions of nonindependent directors against an
ordinary negligence standard may undermine other policies behind
the business judgment rule.
Recent decisions under the business judgment rule consistently
support, and can be read as strong judicial encouragement of, the
62. See note 60 supra; HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 8 (''two thirds of
recently elected outside directors surveyed . . . in another study report that the opportunity to
contribute was the reason they joined boards"). Mace reported that chief executives joined the
boards of other companies to learn, and compare the experiences with those in their own
companies. M. MACE, supra note 3, at 109. Chief executives and retired chief executives are
the two largest sources of outside directors. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 1. The retired
senior executives are undoubtedly motivated by a strong desire to "relive" challenging experiences and to compare them with those at their former company. For the former high government officials, the members of academia and the bar, the board experience can easily be
visualized as "new and challenging."
63. Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 317 (footnote omitted), propose a statutory damage "ceiling keyed to the financial circumstances of the individual defendant and applicable
only to cases involving exclusively violations of the duty of due care," The ceiling is a maximum of "the highest Annual Gross Income of such person during the five calendar years
preceding" the verdict, and in some cases, the total director's fees received. Id at 335. A
ceiling would be quite helpful in preserving the thin margin of decision, but both the ceiling
and the standard ("due care") proposed may be pegged too high for the target population.
The chief executive of another company is the prime source of independent directors. That
chief executive may change the margin of decision if the threat involves one year's past income
(which may be a million dollars or more) and a stigmatizing finding that he or she is a negligent businessperson.
64. See note 70 i'!fra.
65. See notes 101-05 i,ifra and accompanying text.
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trend toward independent directors. In the corporate takeover area,
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 66 and Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc. 67 are significant. Both cases protected the decision of the board
to resist a takeover by another corporation under the business judgment rule. In Panter, the Seventh Circuit stated:
We also note that a majority of the directors of Field's were "independent": they derived no income from Field's other than normal
directors' fees and the equivalent of an employee discoun~ on merchandise. The presumption of good faith the business judgment rule
affords is heightened when the majority of the board consists of independent outside directors. 68
In Crouse-Hinds, the Second Circuit held that a director's "interest"
t

in remaining a director, standing alone, is insufficient to tebut the
presumption under the business judgment rule that directors have
acted properly and in good faith. 69 The truly independent director
will meet the Crouse-Hinds test because, by definition, he does not
have significant pecuniary interests in the corporation. Other cases
in the takeover area indicate that corporate officers and other persons who have direct pecuniary interests in the corporation (such as
its retained attorney) face higher burdens of proof or more stringent
liability standards than other directors when the board's decision is
challenged.70
An.other recent line of cases involves the power of independent
directors to dismiss stockholder derivative suits brought.against their
codirectors.71 Although the subject is beyond the scope of this Article, one can at least recognize the great, and often absolute, protection that independent directors can provide management directors
under the business judgment rule. These cases thus create strong incentives for management to invite independents to join the board.
C. Preserving Equality Among the Directors

Members of the peer groups that the behavioral sciences rank
best for decision-making must maintain their equality inter se. The
66. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3443 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981).
67. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. 646 F.2d at 294.
69. 634 F.2d at 702.
70. See, e.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (directors who had no personal
financial interest in preventing a minority shareholder from gaining control had a lighter burden of proof in justifying a corporate purchase of the minority shareholder's stock than those
directors who had a financial interest); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962)
(Chairman-President held liable; other directors not liable; but Chairman-President failed to
advise board of facts in a timely fashion).
11. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49.
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chief executive no longer dominates the independent board; all directors deal with each other from positions of equal power and influence - peers, in the truest sense. However, equality is fragile.
Seemingly small tinkering may upset the fine balance.
A stark example would be granting directors the power to remove a codirector from office with or without cause, but most boards
have no such power. 72 A more subtle threat to peerage was recently
advocated in a Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") staff
report that would increase the functions of the new board's nominating committee. Most of the largest corporations have a committee of
the board, composed of a majority of independent directors, which
recommends nominees for election as directors to fill vacancies created by resignation, death, and other causes. The courts should consider such a nominating committee favorably when asked to protect
directors from liability because it furthers the goal of making directors independent of management. However, the new board should
reject the proposal in the SEC staff report that this committee also
evaluate "the performance of incumbent directors in determining
whether to recommend them for re-election."73
The power of certain directors to evaluate the other directors
may reduce the quality of decision-making because it will "unpeer"
the director group. Oliver Williamson has pointed out that experience-rating and monitoring by certain individuals creates a hierarchy rather than a peer group. He has also argued that peer groups
punish individual malingering in one way or another, rendering formal evaluation unnecessary.74 Recent corporate data tend indirectly to support Williamson. In 1980, 12.7% of nominating
committees had responsibility for evaluating incumbent directors.
This percentage represents a thirty-two percent decrease in the
number of nominating committees performing this function the year
before.75
If the board limits its evaluation to wholly superficial factors,
such as frequency of attendance at meetings, it may not undermine
equality. However, even this superficial function has now been
taken over by the federal proxy rules. Under those rules, the annual
proxy statement sent to shareholders must disclose the name of each
72. Delaware has wisely stated that conferring such a power on co-directors would be a
"dangerous precedent." See Bruch v. National Guar. Credit Corp., 13 Del. Ch. 180, 186-90,
I 16 A. 738, 741-42 (1922).
73. STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 526-27.
74. 0. WILLIAMSON, supra note 46, at 46, 49, 53.
75. SEC 1980 Study, supra note 4, at 1554.
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director attending fewer than seventy-five percent of the meetings of
the board and assigned committees.76
The last potential vestige of subtle management influence over
the truly independent director - and a potential threat to peerage derives from the probability that the chief executive still initially
selects the new independent director nominees.77 But it is also likely
that the independent nominees now selected are persons friendly or
known to both the independents and the chief executive.78 A recent
survey found that an independent committee and not the chief exe·cutive now makes the "initial decisions in approving a prospective
director,"79 but the survey did not ask who made the initial
suggestion.
The proposition that even the independent directors with no
business or familial ties to management are nevertheless especially
loyal or beholden to the chief executive because the chief executive
was responsible for their nomination is unrealistic. As previously
argued, 80 the independent director today serves by a slight "margin"
of decision, not by a margin that commands special obedience or
loyalty to the procurer. Finally, one should remember that a time
lag separates structural and substantive change. The independent
nominating committee is a recent structural change, and the recent
data suggest that it is having a substantive effect. Soon structure will
transform to substance. Those who have argued to the contrary rely
on data rendered stale by more recent events. 81
76. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1S384, 16 SEC DocKET 348 (Dec. 6, 1978).
77. See THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 14 ("Most of the new directors (56%) were
selected for a board on the basis of prior contact with management. . . .").
78. Of companies with sales volumes over $1 billion, 70% use the nominating committee,
consisting of one inside and four outside directors, to locate outside directors for the new
board. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8, 22. In response to the survey question "How
are outside directors located for the board?" the same Korn/Ferry report states the responses
as follows: "Recommendation and known to chairman - 77.6%; Recommendation and
known to board members - 77.3%." Id at 22. The fair inference from this is that the new
nominees are known to both the chief executive and one or more independent directors.
79. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3.
80. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra. But see THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12,
at 14-1S.
81. See Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 49, at 284 & nn.124, 125. Professors Coffee and
Schwartz and others rely, in part, on the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles Profile of the Board of
Directors which found that 37% of "the organizations participating reported having fired a
director." HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., PROFILE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 11 (1971).
Because the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles questionnaire was sent to the chief executive of the
participating corporations, commentators interpreting the above-quoted phrase concluded that
the chief executive (rather than the board as a group) had removed the director. See Coffee &
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 283 n.125; Note, The Business Judgment Rule in .Derivative Suits
Against .Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 620 n.103 (1980). Neither the quotation nor the
question posed by Heidrick & Struggles ("has a director of your company ever been 'fired'?")
supports the commentators' conclusion. See Letter from Heidrick and Struggles, Inc. to Pro-
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PROMOTING HIGH-QUALITY DECISION-MAKING
IN PEER GROUPS

Many of the country's largest corporate entities have recently begun to move toward peer group decision-making. By judiciously
manipulating corporate law, the courts can further this trend. But all
peer groups are not alike, and not every current corporate governance proposal is conducive to good decision-making. In this respect,
the behavioral sciences can offer considerable guidance to legislatures, courts, and the new boards.
A.

Group Cohesiveness and the New Board

Group composition is an important factor in the quality of decision-making. As behavioral scientists confirm, an individual's performance varies depending upon the other individuals in the
group. 82 The degree to which members of a group are attracted to
each other and to the group, and the morale of the group is called
"cohesiveness." There is no direct evidence tying the degree of cohesiveness to an objective standard of excellence in decision-making,
but Shaw has summarized the indirect evidence:
[H]igh-cohesive groups are more effective than low-cohesive groups in
achieving their goals. The cohesive group does whatever it tries to do
better than the noncohesive group.
. . . It follows that group problem solving should be facilitated by
group cohesiveness. Despite some negative findings . . . the empirical
fessor Robert J. Haft (July 14, 1981) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). The 1977
Heidrick & Struggles Profile posed the same question and reports that the proportion of
"boards" who have terminated a directorship by some means "has increased slightly since
1971." HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 12.
The distribution of "lackluster'' directors in the population may well be a constant, without
bespeaking anything on the relative power today of the chief executive versus the new board
over the independent directors. Other and more recent Heidrick & Struggles data is more
significant. In their 1977 Profile, the chief executive was "[t]he initial decision maker regarding a prospective director'' in 42.9% of companies with annual sales of $1 billion or more, all
directors as a group in 29% and the nominating committee in 14% of these companies,
HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1977, supra note 14, at 8. Their "1980 Update" indicates that a
strong shift occurred between the 1977 and 1980 reports. The "initial decision-maker in approving board prospects" is now the nominating committee in 69% of companies with annual
sales of$2 billion or more, all directors as a group in 6.4% and the chief executive in 16.7% of
these companies. In companies with sales between $1 billion and $1.9 billion, the corresponding figures were 43.5%, 10.9% and 34.8%. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES 1980, supra note 4, at 3.
In all fairness to those who rely on the 1971 Heidrick & Struggles statistics, it must be
recognized that they use that data in an entirely different context, and one which has been
excepted from this author's proposals: the dismissal by directors of derivative suits against codirectors (usually management). Behaviorally, it is much easier for the independents to criticize the chief executive for a business proposal now before the board than to permit a large
damage suit against him or her to go forward.
82. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 211-13.
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evidence generally supports this expectation.83

Underlying cohesiveness is friendship. Groups of close friends
solve problems more efficiently than do various friend-stranger
groupings. Increased ease of communication is probably a major
factor, 84 as well as the readiness of individuals to be influenced by, to
trust, and to respond positively to the actions of friends. 85 In fact,
interpersonal trust has been confirmed as an essential precondition
to effective group problem solving. 86
Boards of directors can be very cohesive groups. Conflict among
group members decreases cohesiveness when the dispute concerns
principles; "however, when the group members agree on principles
but are in disagreement over matters that assume adherence to those
principles, the conflict enhances cohesiveness." 87 The members of
both the new and old boards have common objectives and values
and agree on the principles applicable to the largest private aggregations of economic power because they are drawn from the very same
socioeconomic group. And "membership in a persistently high status group" also promotes cohesiveness88 - a finding particularly applicable to the boards of our larg~st corporations. Certain
governance and liability proposals, however, may undermine the
board's cohesiveness, and reduce the quality of its de9isions.
1.

Constituency Directors

The empirical findings support the nearly universal rejection of
the idea of appointing directors to "represent" different corporate
83. Id. at 225, 395 (citations omitted). See A. HARE, HANDBOOK OF SMALL GROUP RESEARCH 340 (2d ed. 1976). However, Hare points out that friends can also agree to malinger:
"A slowdown may also occur if the group members conspire to lower the output. The efforts
of the group to impose a slowdown will be more effective if the group members are highly
congenial." Id. at 209 (citation omitted).
84. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 209. See Donahue, Hawes & Mabee, Testing a StructuralFunctional Model of Group Decision Making Using Markov Analysis, 7 HUMAN COMMUNICATIONS RESEARCH 133-46 (1981).
85. See M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, supra note 39, at 68-70; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 215.
For an example of a study showing that compatibility among group members leads to more
rapid problem solving, see Reddy & Byrnes, Effects ofInterpersonal Group Composition on the
Problem-Solving Behavior of Middle Managers, 56 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 516, 517 (1972).
86. Zand, Trust and Managerial Problem Solving, 17 Ao. Set. Q. 229, 238 (1972). An excellent review of the empirical evidence concerning trust in experimental and natural groups
and in organizations is contained in Golembiewski & McConkie, The Centrality of Interpersonal Trust in Group Processes, in THEORIES OF GROUP PROCESSES 131, 156-78 (C. Cooper ed.
1975). Trust and distrust are "spirally reinforced," ie., trust leads to ever more trust, and
distrust leads to ever more distrust. Id. at 139, 175.
87. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 215. See Sole, Marton & Hornstein, Opinion Similarity and
Helping: Three Field Experiments Investigating the Bases ofPromotive Tension, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCH. l (1975).
88. M. OLMSTED & A. HARE, supra note 39, at 113.
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"constituencies," such as employees or consumers.89 Alvin Zander
cited empirical evidence that "an adversary relationship among
members" derogates from the quality of decision-making. Each
member tries to persuade the representatives of other constituencies,
but does not accept their influence: "The oral contributions are no
more useful than no comments at all." 90 Barnlund, who analyzed
group superiority, found that two factors accounted for a majority of
the group errors in his experiments. One factor was that groups
faced with intense disagreement either compromised on a third solution or the "less aggressive members" surrendered to the other faction. "Apparently disagreement stimulates thought up to a point;
beyond that point, groups may lack the patience and skill to exploit
it." 91 In a more recent empirical study comparing the quality of decisions by groups with "representatives" with decisions of other
groups, the representative groups made lower quality decisions. 92
But if the various constituencies must "accept" the group decision,
then representatives must be included in the group, adversely affecting decision "quality."93
2. Cumulative Voting

Cumulative voting for directors also leads to directors as representatives, in this case, of different shareholder constituencies.
Shareholders with large holdings are given the opportunity to gain
representation on the board in proportion to t~eir holdings.94 Seventeen states currently mandate cumulative voting, and about thirty
states permit it. 95 Although forceful arguments have been made for
and against cumulative voting,96 the cohesiveness findings suggest
that shareholder representatives, like other constituency representatives, would detract from quality decision-making.
89. See STAFF REPORT, note 16 supra, at 459-68.
90. A. ZANDER, supra note 46, at 78.
91. Barnlund, supra note 32, at 59.
92. Stumpf, Freedman & Zand, Judgmental .Decisions: A Study of Interactions Among
Group Membership, Group Functioning, and the .Decision Situation, 22 ACAD. MoT. J. 765, 769
(1979).
93. Id But the constituency form of decision-making is precisely the type engaged in by
the various corporate coalitions and organizational subunits below the board and the chief
executive in maintaining operations. See note 43 supra.
94. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 258-59 (5th ed.
unabr. 1980).
95. Id at 260.
96. Id
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3. Recent SEC Proxy Amendments
The .SEC has recently amended the federal proxy rules to facilitate voting on each director individually. 97 Now shareholders have
the opportunity not to vote for a particular director while voting in
favor of the rest of the slate of nominees. A shareholder can still
conform to the traditional practice of voting the entire director slate
either up or down, 98 but prior to the amendment the typical form of
proxy provided by companies impeded shareholders who wanted to
cast a vote for or againsf an individual director. Another recent
amendment requires public disclosure of the votes cast by shareholders concerning an individual director who was elected but received
five percent or more negative or withheld votes. 99 Although these
amendments may further "shareholder democracy'' in the election of
directors of very large corporations - a dubious proposition - they
may be counterproductive to the cohesiveness of the new board by
making the performance of individual directors an electoral issue.
The SEC received many negative comments on this rule:
Many commentators believed that rulemaking in the area of corporate
accountability should focus on strengthening the independent role of
the board, as well as the structure of the board and its committee system, rather than unduly politicizing the corporate electoral process
through a. provision for individual voting. Others commented that
when shareholders vote for directors, they are voting for or against the
board as a cohesive managing body and have little interest in individual nominees. 100
'Fhe SEC did not directly respond to these perceptive comments. It
has failed in these instances correctly to resolve the tensions between
certain outdated notions of shareholder democracy in the very large
corporation and conditions conducive to high-quality decisions by
the new board.
4. Liability Distinctions Among Directors
Some cases have drawn liability or burden of proof distinctions
among directors. In the case of decision-making by the board and
true group tasks undertaken by the new board, such as the review of
a securities registration statement or proxy statement, the standard of
97. Rule 14a-4(b)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14-4(b)(2) (1980). See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16356, 18 SEC DocKET 997, 998-1000 (Nov. 23, 1979).
98. Voting "down" an entire slate occurs in a proxy fight between two factions or in a
takeover struggle in which each side proposes its own full board slate.
99. Schedule 14A, Item 6(g)(l), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14A-101 (1980). See 18 SEC DOCKET,
supra note 97, at 999.
100. 18 SEC DocKET, supra note 97, at 999.
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liability should be uniform as to all directors. 101 The courts should
promote group cohesiveness and discourage individual strategic behavior. Individualized definitions of due care and directorial duty
are inconsistent with this goal. The obvious exceptions are instances
in which a director, usually from management, has practiced fraud
upon the group itself, by failing to disclose facts that he knows are
important to the group task and unknown to the others, and instances in which a particular director has a personal interest in conflict with the group activity. The "actual fraud" exception recognizes
that act most destructive of group cohesiveness - disloyalty to the
group itself. In the typical conflict of interest case, the law already
requires the interested director to disclose the conflict and withdraw
from that specific group decision. 102
Some cases have distinguished directors who are inside officers
from directors who are not. 103 To the extent that the courts believed
the insiders knew the damning facts but did not tell the outsiders, the
distinction approximates the disloyalty to the group exception. Unless a particular director had actual knowledge, however, no distinctions based on supposed inequalities of access to information or of
relevant expertise among the directors as such 104 should be made.
The famous Delaware case of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 105
refused to draw any liability distinctions among directors for group
conduct - either the group was liable or not. The court held the
board not liable on the ground that the board had no duty to investi101. In twenty-eight states, common law defines the duty of care of directors. Twenty-two
states have statutory definitions. The common law jurisdictions obviously can make the standard uniform, through judicial decisions. So can the statutory jurisdictions because most provide a uniform and objective standard, absent actual individual knowledge of impropriety
("good faith"). Although the language of the uniform standard varies from statute to statute,
most are similar to section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act: "[W)ith such care as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." Guidebook, supra note 5, at 1631. But see id at 1601, in which the ABA committee "recognizes that
the special background and qualifications of a particular director • . . may place greater responsibility on that director."
102. See w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 565-86, 600-06. A few states still
adhere to the old view that a transaction between a director and the corporation is voidable
even if fair. Id at 583-84; N. LATTIN, supra note 57, § 80, at 291 n.67. See Bulbulia & Pinto,
Statutory Responses to Interested .Directors' Transactions: A Watering .Down ofFiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 201, 204-05 (1977); Buxbaum, Conflict-of-Interest Statutes and
the Needfar a .Demand on .Directors in .Derivative Actions, 68 CALIF, L. REV. 1122 (1980),
103. See-Bates v. Dresser, 251 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1920); w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra
note 94, at 535-36.
104. If management as such should have informational duties to the new board, the courts
should handle the prpblem directly. The last part of the Article proposes that this duty be
placed on key management as such, and that the informational duties imposed by present law
on directors as such be removed or strongly diluted. See notes 244-57 infra and accompanying
text.
105. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
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gate whether the employees were engaged in illegal acts, absent some
tangible warning signs to the board. The case has been criticized on
the basis of its narrow view of board duties, but its group approach
to the issue is not counterproductive of cohesiveness.
Certain liability distinctions among directors may be justified by
policies that outweigh the promotion of high-quality decisions
through group cohesiveness. For example, the incentive to serve rationale, which, as previously argued, should provide the truly independent directors with an almost absolute business judgment
defense, leaves open the possibility of denying these benefits to management directors. Such a distinction would serve the currently
more important goal of encouraging the selection of truly independent directors for the boards of the very largest corporations. And the
findings that peer groups make better decisions than do individuals
and nonpeer groups are more extensive and clear than the findings
that link the cohesiveness of the group with the quality of its performance. Put to choices, therefore, the courts should continue to
distinguish among directors based upon true independence to promote collegial decision-making among equals, though group cohesiveness may thereby diminish. No substantial behavioral case,
however, can be made for distinctions among the independent directors, absent the unlikely event of actual fraud or clearly illegal action
by one of these directors.
The federal courts have imposed civil damage liability upon directors under provisions of the federal securities laws, such as ruJ.es
lOb-5 and 14a-9 of the 1934 Act and section 1r of the 1933 Act. The
federal cases have overanalyzed the behavior of individual directors,
and, in so doing, have failed or been unwilling to recognize that
board activities are essentially group activities, not the sum total of
individual acts. To the extent that legal rules place different pressures on different members of a group with the same group goal,
group cohesiveness may diminish. And when the stakes of a decision are different for different individuals in the group, coalitions
may form or individual strategic behavior detrimental to high-quality decisions may occur.106
106. The economic stakes of business decisions are different for the inside senior executives
on the board than for the independent directors. A perceptive and experienced group of independent directors will properly "discount" the self-interest of the insiders when making
business decisions. But the independent directors cannot "discount" for the relative accuracy
or inaccuracy of the information upon which the decision is based. "[T)he amount, quality,
and structure of the information that reaches the board is almost wholly within the control of
the corporation's executives. . . . [T]his kind of power over information flow is virtually
equivalent to power over decision." Eisenberg, Legal Models ofManagement Structure in the
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For example, section 11 of the 1933 Act imposes huge liabilities
on every director who fails to exercise due diligence concerning the
accuracy of the registration statement used to sell securities. Its language weakly suggests, but clearly does not compel, an interpretation
requiring the court to evaluate the diligence of each individual director, rather than the diligence exercised by the board as a whole. 107
Yet, iri the only two cases that examined directors' duties under section 11, both courts stressed the liability of the particular director
based on his particular actions and inactions and his particular background and experience. 108 Although each court held all of the directors liable, neither court analyzed the director group's failure
reasonably to reach its one clear group goal - an accurate registration statement. A registration statement is a group effort, involving
the directors, lawyers, accountants, officers, and others. The implicit
suggestion of both cases - that someday, one director may be held
liable and another exonerated - may be counterproductive both to
the overall quality of board decision-making and to group preparation of an accurate registration statement.
The SEC has reinforced this individualized approach to the
board in various public reports relating to the bankruptcies of cert_ain corporations. For example, in its reports on Stirling Homex,
Penn Central, and National Telephone, the SEC strongly criticized
the actions and inactions of particular directors. 109 These directors
were understandably unable to overcome the board's norms. The
hope that one director will courageously rise above the group is unrealistic, particularly in a cohesive group.
Modem Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 380 (1975)
(footnote omitted).
107. Section 11 provides in relevant part:
[N]o person . . . shall be liable • • • who shall sustain the burden of proof. • . that • • •
he had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe • • •
that [the registration statement was accurate] ••••
In determining . . • what constitutes reasonable investigation and reasonable ground
for belief, the standard of reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the
management of his own property.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77K(b)(3)(A), 77K(c) (1976).
108. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
109. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,516, 7 SEC DocKET 298 (July 2, 1975) (Stirling Homex Corp.); SEC STAFF REPORT, THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE OF THE PENN CENTRAL
COMPANY, printed far the use of SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIOATIONS OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FORElON COMMERCE, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 151-72 (1972); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14380, 13 SEC DOCKET 1393 (Jan. 16, 1978) (National Telephone Co., Inc.).
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5. Continuity of Board Membership

Continuity of association among group members, like that
among friends, promotes group cohesiveness, and thus promotes
high-quality group decisions as well. 110 With very high cohesiveness, however, a counterproductive tendency toward conformity of
opinion develops - "groupthink." 111 The old board was probably
too cohesive and in-bred, 112 dominated as it was by the company's
executives who worked together on a daily basis under the leadership of the chief executive. The new board may well strike a fine
balance between incest and indifference among group members. It
meets almost monthly as a full board, and each director also meets
about six times a year in small committee groupings; more meetings
and more group work appear to be the trend. 113 Add to this the
likelihood that the independents have other social connections with
each other, and the board has the makings of a cohesive group that
avoids the evils of groupthink.
As in the case of cumulative voting, tensions exist between certain notions of "shareholder democracy'' and quality decisions by
the new board. All states require the election of some directors annually, thus introducing at least the possibility of constant turnover
in the boardroom. However, continuity of the director group in the
large corporation persisted in the past, primarily because of manage110. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 330-32, 340.

111. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 218-22. See, e.g., Cartwright & Zander, Pressures to
Un!formity in Groups: Introduction, in GROUP DYNAMICS 139, 147 (D. Cartwright & A.
Zander eds. 3d ed. 1968). Irving Janis wrote: "I use the term 'groupthink' as a quick and easy
way to refer to a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a
cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to
realistically appraise alternative courses of actions." I. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK 9
(1972).
112. Group cohesiveness promotes the development of attitudes among members of ingroup superiority ("group egocentrism") as contrasted with other groups. See, e.g., I. JANIS,
supra note ll I, at 197, 203-04 ("shared illusion of invulnerability"); Myers & Bach, Group
J)iscussion Effects on Conflict Behavior and Se!f-Just!ftcation, 38 PSYCH. REP. 135, 135 (1976)
(competition with other groups enhances these attitudes).
An empirical study suggests that in terms of economic measures of performance, the proportion of outside directors is ofno significance. J. PENNINGS, INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES
154-55 (1980). In fact,
[t]irms that have permitted a greater influx of outside directors have a slight tendency to
lower performance levels, but the relationships are insignificant for most of the effectiveness indicators • . . • From the results . . • 1t appears that boards dominated by insiders
benefit from their cohesiveness rather than suffer from groupthink. However, . . . the
coefficients are extraordinarily small . . . .
Id
I 13. Boards of companies with annual sales of between $1 billion and $5 billion meet
between eight and ten times per year. Each committee meets at least twice during the year,
with many meeting an average of four to six times per year. KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6,
at 12, 19.
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ment's control of the proxy machinery and its domination of the
board. The nominating committee of the new board has largely replaced the chief executive as the keeper of proxy machinery. Thus,
the new board's independent directors will preserve continuity of
board membership.
Continuity can be structurally furthered by providing for the
classification of directors, with staggered terms of two or more years
for each director. Each year only a number, but fewer than a majority, of the directors are up for election. Most states permit this by
statute. 114 Although subject to potential abuse in limited circumstances, 115 classification promotes cohesion and continuity and may
be especially helpful during the present "shake-out" or transition period for the new board. 116

B. Other Conditionsfor High-Quality Decisions
This Article has presented evidence that, all other things being
equal, peer groups make higher quality decisions than do individuals
or nonpeer groups, and that group cohesiveness is an important factor in quality decision-making. Obviously many variables affect
group decision-making. 117 But two matters receive particular em114. A. FREY, J. CHOPER, N. LEECH & C. MORRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORA·
TIONS 417 (2d ed. 1977).
115. Id
116. Id Although highly unlikely, it would follow that if the portion of directors up for
election in the very largest corporations are defeated, the entire "cohesive" board should then
resign. "The largest industrials do not use this device as frequently (as smaller industrials), In
fact, the proportion of premier size industrials staggering terms has declined from 13.9 percent
to 11.2 percent over the past five years." HEIDRICK & STRUOOLES 1977, supra note 14, at I I.
Cf. Schotland, Conclusions and Recommendations, in ABUSE ON WALL STREET 565, 576 (1980)
(Twentieth Century Fund Report) (The unaffiliated directors of pension funds and other nonprofit institutions should have "terms at least as long as (and preferably longer than) the terms
of other directors; otherwise, unaffiliated directors may be tempted to sacrifice their independence to retain their directorships.").
117. The variables researched include noise, member proximity, seating arrangements, and
other factors which affect communication networks. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 260-77,
343-44; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 118-66, 392-93. Research has also been done on the effects
of type of task, leadership behavior and individual personality on group problem solving. See
A. HARE, supra note 83, at 330-56; M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 315-89. The Article does not
discuss these variables because each either is unlikely to affect board decision-making or, as in
the case of individual personality, is far too complex for researchers to have even established
base principles at this time.
Should group composition be homogeneous or heterogeneous? One aspect of this question,
focusing on individual abilities, is fiat and obvious; other aspects, dealing with race and with
gender, are explosive. Groups composed of members having diverse but relevant abilities perform more effectively than groups composed of members having similar abilities. M. SHAw,
supra note 23, at 259. Heterogeneity with respect to personality characteristics also appears to
facilitate group problem solving. See id at 395; Hoffman, Homogeneity ofMember Personoli't
and its Effect on Group Problem-Solving, 58 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 27, 31 (1959) (expenmental "results imply that a multiplicity of perceptions of a problem are productive of creative
solutions"); Hoffman, Harburg & Maier, Differences and Disagreement as Factors in Creative
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phasis in the behavioral literature. First, is there an optimal group
Group Problem Solving, 64 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 206 (1962); Hoffman & Maier, Quali-

ty and Acceptance of Problem Solutions by Members of Homeogeneous and Heterogeneous
Groups, 62 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 401 (1961); Pelz, Some Social Factors Related to
Pe,formance in a Research Organization, l Ao. Sci. Q. 310 (1956) (performance of research
scientists benefited from frequent association with colleagues having a variety of values, experiences and disciplines). The evidence becomes equivocal and inadequate past this obvious
point. Shaw states:
Although there are some negative results, the bulk of the evidence suggests that groups
that are compatible with respect to needs and personality characteristics are able to . . .
achieve their goals more effectively than groups whose members are incompatible with
respect to needs and personality characteristics.
M. SHAw, supra note 23, at 258. See Schutz, What Makes Groups Productive?, 6 HUMAN REL.
429, 454-55 (1955) (compatible groups utilize their resources more effectively than other
groups). However, Shaw points out that compatibility is a vague concept and that the tools for
measuring it are crude. See M. SHAw, supra note 23, at 260.
Shaw refers to only one study that questions whether mixed-sex groups are more effective
than homogeneous groups. That study, reported in 1978, involved a management task requiring the group to decide the correct placement of six trainees. Each group had a leader and two
followers. Group performance was measured by the time required to complete the task. Heterogeneous groups performed better than homogeneous groups with both male and female
leaders. Shaw suggests that this study may have limited relevance because the differences may
have been the result of the differential behavior of leaders in mixed-sex and same-sex groups.
M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 246, 259.
In the past decade, a number of studies attempted to measure the efficiency of racially
mixed groups and racially homogeneous groups. None of these studies involved measurement
of the quality of decision-making by the different groups. Efficiency was measured by the
relative time required to complete simple tasks. In some of the studies, the racially mixed
groups took more time to complete these tasks. The only reliable finding is that the racial
composition of the group influenced the feelings and behaviors of group members, with some
evidence that the tension created in the racially mixed groups inhibited effective group interaction. Id at 249-51. The evidence is not only extremely limited, but the differences, in the
words of Shaw, "may or may not adversely affect group performance." Id at 260. Further,
both the gender and race research consisted of laboratory experiments with college students
and field observations of blue-collar workers conducted some years ago. This would appear to
have little or no relevance to the manner in which the composition of the board of directors
affects the quality of decision-making.
Some commentators have expressed their concern that a board contain a diversity of points
of view and a sensitivity to different issues and different shareholder interests. However, most
commentators supporting director diversity do not support constituency directorships. See
STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 459-68.
.
Variety is the spice of directorial decisions. The SEC Staff Report states:
Ralph Lazarus representing the Business Roundtable noted: "You don't want a monolithic board; you want a board that's made up of different backgrounds." The Business
Roundtable Statement on ''The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the
Large Publicly Owned Corporation" also endorses the importance of seeking directors
from outside the business community. Similarly, another commentator noted: "With a
requisite degree of independence, all members of the board will feel a compulsion to take
initiatives and espouse special causes from time to time, and not always the same cause.
This is true of all who are worthy of board membership, regardless of sex, race, religious
background, or other distinction. Indeed, there is a positive advantage in having board
members with diverse experiences and qackgrounds, who are capable of relating them to
the corporate interest. The character of the individual is what is really paramount."
Id at 467 (emphasis in original; footnotes omitted) (quoting C. BROWN, PUTTING THE CORPORATE BOARD TO WORK 117 (1976)). The Heidrick and Struggles survey of the 1300 largest
corporations reported: "[N)early three-quarters of the organizations report no members of a
racial or ethnic minority as board members, and 68 percent of the companies have no women
directors." ~EIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 1979 UPDATE 4 (1979).
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size for decision-making? Second, which decision rule is preferable
- consensus or majority rule?
1.

Group Size

The size of the group obviously influences its performance. 118
The range of resources available to the group increases with group
size, as does the probability that the group will contain at least one
member capable of performing the task. But relatively fewer group
members then participate, forming subgroups as a result. 119 Thelen
suggested the "principle of least group size": just large enough to
include individuals with all the relevant skills for problem solution.120 Bales reported that the optimum group size in his group decision experiments was five. 121 Slater found five to be the optimum
size when individual member "satisfaction" with the intellectual task
of the group is an important criterion.1 22 Subjective satisfaction with
118. See Steiner, Models far Infilling Relations/tips Between Group Size and Potential
Group Productivity, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. 273 (1966).
119. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 168-69. See Bales, The Equilibrium Problem in Small
Groups, in WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION 111, 131-32 (1953).
120. See Thelen, Group .Dynamics in Instruction: Principle efLeast Group Size, 57 SCHOOL
REv. 139 (1949), cited in M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 243.
121. See Bales, In Conference, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1954, at 44, 48. (reporting
results of experiments at the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations).
122. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 229; Slater, Contrasting Correlates ef Group Size, 21
SOCIOMETRY 129 (1958).
The Supreme Court has indirectly dealt with the question of "optimal" group size in a
different context: jury size. In Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), it held that a sixmember jury satisfies the constitutional guarantee of a jury in a state criminal trial. The Court
relied on empirical studies and theoretical writings. 399 U.S. at 101 nn.48 & 49. A new set of
studies was cited in the later opinions concerning jury size. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 158-60 & n.15 (1973); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 231-39 & nn.10-32, 243-44 nn.3437 & 39-41 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Blackmun, J.). Ballew held that a five-member jury did
not satisfy the constitutional requirement in a state criminal trial. See generally Lermack, No
Right Number? Social Science Research and the Jury-Size Cases, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 951, 963
(1979) (Justice Blackmun did not differentiate between empirical and nonempirical work and
the studies he cited do not support his conclusions); Nagel, Value Reinforcement as a Key to
Policy Research Utilization, in THE UsE-NONUSE-MISUSE OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH
IN THE COURTS 106, 106-09 (1980) (criticizing Justice Blackmun's "selective" use and citation
of the author's research model for Type I errors - convicting the innocent - and Type II
errors - not convicting the guilty); Kaye, And Then There Were Twelve: Statistical Reasoning,
the Supreme Court, and the Size efthe Jury, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 1004, 1019-20 (1980).
Justice Blackmun in Ballew states: "When individual and group decisionmaking were
compared, it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were
frequently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted. Groups also exhibited increased motivation and self-criticism." 435 U.S. at 233. Justice Blackmun cited Bamlund in support of the
statement. 435 U.S. at 233 n.15 (citing Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscemible" .D!lferences:
Empirical Research and the Jury Size Cases, 13 MICH. L. R.Ev. 644, 687-88 (1975) (citing
Barnlund, supra note 32, at 58-59)). These findings have not been challenged, to the author's
knowledge, in the still-raging debate among scholars on the jury size issue. The optimum jury
size issue implicates other values besides accuracy and quality, such as the value of having a
representative cross-section of the community on a state criminal jury. One might logically
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the task is an incentive that a board should offer to attract independent directors.
The growing use of committees to make certain board decisions
will promote high-quality decision-making. The average size of a
board committee in the large corporation is five. 123 The various state
statutes permitting full delegation of the board's powers to a committee and the uniform acceptance by the courts of committee decisions
as the equivalent of board decisions are likewise consistent with the
goal of high-quality group decisions.
2. .Decision by Consensus
The decision rule employed by a group affects the quality of its
decisions. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that a consensus
decision rule leads to higher quality decisions than majority rule.
Studies by Hall and Watson and by Nemirofffound that groups that
decided by consensus made higher quality decisions in the NASA
Moon Survival Problem. 124 The instructions to the "consensus"
groups did not require unanimous concurrence on each aspect of the
complex problem, but suggested that the group not limit discussion
solely to that sufficient to reach a simple majority vote. Other groups
operated on the majority vote principle. The researchers attributed
the superior results of the consensus groups to the fact that the consensus rule forced the groups to recognize and deal with differences
of opinion rather than to deny or ignore them. Nemiroff concluded
rather firmly that consensus is the best decision rule for a peer
group.12s
.
urge this ''value" in the corporate context, see, e.g., note 89 supra (discussing "constituency"
directors), but it has no bearing on qualitative excellence in business decisions.
Consideration has recently been given to group decision-making by appellate courts. See
Jones, Multitude of Counsellors: Appel/ale Adjudicalion as Group .Decision-Making, 54 TULANE
L. REV. 541, 553-55 (1980).
123. See KORN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 12.
124. See notes 35-36 supra.
125. See Nemiroff, supra note 36, at 2. See also Robertson, Small Group .Decision Making.·
17ze Uncertain Role ofInformation in Reducing Uncertainty, 2 POL. BEHAVIOR 163, 163 (1980)
(a consensus rule will increase search activity, but if the result is informational overload, the
group will be uncertain about its decisions).. Mathematical models have been devised and
computer simulations used to compare decision outcomes under simple majority rules and
other decision rules. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 344-54. If majority rule is binding, coalitions may develop in the group. The opportunities for a combination of two or more minorities in opposition to a leading proposal must then be explored. Many theoretical and empirical
articles analyze the formation and maintenance of coalitions. See, e.g., Komorita & Chertkoff,
A Bargaining Theory of Coalition Formation, 80 (No. 3) PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 149 (1973).
Many are based on various "game" theories, which make behavioral assumptions as to how
persons "should" act - i.e., rationally and with individual optimization in mind. These studies as well as the bargaining theories are beyond the scope of this Article.
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Decision by consensus is a long standing rule in the non-Western
world, particularly in villages and small groups. 126 Japanese managers decide by consensus in large business organizations. 127 No votes
are taken, but all views are considered until a solution can be found
that incorporates the concerns of all members. Hare conducted a
field study of the Quakers, who have used the consensus method for
over 300 years. He found the method effective when the group is
highly cohesive and shares "common values." 128 Since the new
board, like the old, agrees on common values, the empirical evidence
supports the use of a consensus decision rule, and not a majority
rule, to achieve high-quality decisions. 129
However, a legal requirement that the board reach its decisions
by consensus would be counterproductive. Such a requirement
might cause boards to reach compromise solutions rather than find
solutions of the highest quality, or to embrace all points of view by
leaving final decisions intentionally vague. 130 When the board states
its decision in vague terms, it passes the real decision to the officers
who implement it, in effect delegating decision-making to the chief
executive. 131 Furthermore, the imposition of a consensus rule on the
average thirteen-person board in the large corporation might make
bona fide decision-making practically impossible. Based on the
available evidence on peer-group decisions, optimum group size, and
consensus decisions, however, the courts should accord the greatest
126. A. HARE, supra note 83, at 345.
127. See Drucker, 'What We Can Learn From Japanese Management, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1971, at 110, 111-13. But cf. Pascale, Communication and .Decision Making Across
Cultures: Japanese and American Comparisons, 91 Ao. Sci. Q. 91 (1978) (Managers of
Japanese firms were not found to utilize a consultative decision-making process more extensively than American managers do, which finding did not contradict Drucker's point that Jap•
anese managers spend more time than Americans defining the issues before supplying the
answer). See generally w. MONROE & E. SAKAKIBARA, THE JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
13 (1977); Japanese Management Style Wins Converts, INDUS. WEEK, April 16, 1979, at 19;
Japanese Managers Tell How Their System Works, FORTUNE, Nov. 1977, at 126; Ueda &
Craighead, Patience in Human Relations: Key to .Doing Business in Japan, MOT, REV,, Oct.
1978, at 57.
128. A. P.ARE, supra note 83, at 345.
129. This data has been collected by behavioral scientists observing people in groups. The
mathematical models and computer simulations may in the future point in a different direction, but their assumptions with respect to human behavior and their applications of power
and game theories will have to be more closely examined. This body of literature has distinctive relevance to business organizations. It requires further consideration. For example, the
studies of coalitions in small groups are relevant to the problems of close corporations and
partnerships.
130. See G. ALLISON, EsSENCE OF DECISION 178 (1971); R. MACK, PLANNING ON UNCER·
TAINTY 130 (1971) ("Uncertainty can make coalitions possible which clarity would disrupt."),
131. See Note, .Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J.
1091, 1104 (1976). See generally Hoffman, The Beginnings of a Hierarchical Model of Group
Problem-Solving, in THE GROUP PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS 157 (1979).
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possible deference to a consensus business decision by a five-person
independent committee. 132
C.

Conditions That Impede High-Quality Group .Decisions

Janis tells the story of Alfred Sloan, the former chairman of General Motors, who reportedly announced at a meeting:
Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here. . . . Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this
matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding of what the decision is
all about. 133

In seeking to determine the causes of incorrect group decisions,
Barnlund recognized the malevolent group dynamics that Sloan
tried to avoid: "[G]roup members agreed immediately and unanimously upon the wrong answer to a problem. Further study of the
issue was then considered unnecessary and wasteful. . . . Agreement [became] the criterion of correctness." 134 A recent case history
of a company's faulty acquisition of another business on the strong
recommendation of the chief executive reveals similar decision-making problems. Although the company's board had prestigious and
conscientious independent directors and had received advance information, the directors did not realize that other directors shared their
negative opinions or that senior management, except for the chief
executive, opposed the acquisition, and they did not wish to provoke
conflict with the new chief executive. 135
The studies of group behavior have identified two principal
causes of faulty group decisions - group pressure toward conformity of opinion and unexpressed and subtle group dynamics that
speed up the decision process. After evaluating the behavioral science evidence, this section discusses various techniques for counteracting harmful dynamics and the appropriate judicial incentives to
adopt these techniques.
1.

Conformity Pressures

We have all experienced the pressures toward conformity in a
group. Groups do not encourage dissent. This is intuitively obvious,
and as the social scientists are wont to do, they replicated the obvi132. See note 49 supra and accompanying text
133. I. JANIS, supra note lll, at 218-19.
134. Barnlund, supra note 32, at 59.
135. Levy, Reforming Board Reform, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 166.
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ous in many experimental studies during the 1950s. 136 Janis coined
the word "groupthink" to dramatize the point, 137 and the famous
experiments of Solomon Asch, 138 a Gestalt psychologist, engendered
hundreds of experiments and articles on the subject of conformity.
Asch had his subjects look at lines of different lengths. Each individual merely had to state that one line was longer than the others. The
experimenter's confederates unanimously gave the wrong answer,
and nearly thirty-seven percent of the experimental subjects conformed with the confederates. Later experiments by others demonstrated that conformity pressures increased with the use of complex
problems involving subjective judgments and with the increasing attractiveness of the group to the individual subjects. 139
Of the many empirically identified variables that influenced conformity to the majority, the most powerful variable was the degree of
ambiguity and uncertainty in the problem. The greater the ambiguity and uncertainty, the greater the conformity of the individual to
majority judgment. Asch's experiment represents the least ambiguous situation -judging which line is longer than the others. Sherif s
experiments involved the movement of light under very ambiguous
conditions (the "autokinetic effect"); approximately eight out of
every ten persons yielded to unanimous group decisions. 140 Other
experiments have confirmed that the degree of conformity corresponds closely to the degree of ambiguity involved. 141
Pressures toward conformity thus appear greatest in the very areas where the board of directors operates. Analysis of the information upon which major business decisions are to be based, of the
choices considered, and of the potential consequences of the decision
is complex, ambiguous, and uncertain. And, findings suggest that
conformity is greater in ongoing than in temporary groups. 142
136. For a summary of these studies, see A. HARE, supra note 83, at 19-59; M. OLMSTED &
A. HARE,supra note 39, at 114; M. SHAw,supra note 23, at 280-93. For a general discussion of
the field, see Cartwright & Zander, Pressures to lln!formity in Groups: Introduction, in GROUP
DYNAMICS 139 (3d ed. 1968).
137. See note Ill supra.
138. See Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and J)islorlion of Judgments, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 2 (rev. ed. 1952); Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, ScI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31.
139. See, e.g., Brehm & Mann, Effect of Importance of Freedom and Allraction lo Group
Members on I'!fluence Produced by Group Pressure, 31 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCH. 816
(1975).
140. M. SHERIF & C. SHERIF, AN OUTLINE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 554-55 (rev. ed. 1956).
141. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 282-83. See also Emerson, J)evialion and Rejection:
An Experimental Replication, 19 AM. Soc. REv. 688 (1954) (testing theory that conformity is
related to cohesiveness).
142. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 285-86. In the more successful groups, there is a
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These experiments, however, may overstate the effect of conformity. Asch's classic experiment was the basis for all later conformity research. Asch presented subjects with the unanimous (but
false) judgment of the experimenter's confederates. When one confederate answered correctly or merely stated that he was unable to
make a judgment, conformity decreased from thirty-three percent to
less than six percent. 143 And, Asch's experimentaJ conditions do not
represent the context in which peer groups make decisions. Asch did
not permit any interaction or discussion among the members. 144 In
group discussions, each individual can account for the various positions taken by the other members and can anticipate a satisfactory
interpretation of his or her potential dissent by the others. In Asch's
experiment, "the assault on the [subject's] judgment reaches an intensity virtually unparalleled outside the laboratory." 145 The subject
could neither account for why everybody else was wrong, nor expect
the others to interpret his or her potential dissent satisfactorily.
Most studies of conformity have been designed to explore the negative consequences of conformity - the loss of individuality, the restriction of creativity and the reduction of the group to the level of
mediocrity. 146 In Victims ofGroupthink, Janis emphasized these negative aspects in his dissection of the Bay of Pigs decision by President
Kennedy and his advisors. Most of the pioneers who shaped this
negative cast conducted their experiments during the height of the
McCarthy era. Current empirical studies do not support the existence of blind adherence to the majority only for the sake of agreement. In the most recent summary, Shaw stated:
[U]ndesirable consequences undoubtedly would follow from a blind,
unreasoning "follow the crowd" type of conformity. Fortunately, there
is no evidence that behaving in accordance with group norms necessarily, or even usually, results from such unthinking compliance. In
many, perhaps most, instances, there are good and sufficient reasons
for conforming to group norms. 147

2. The Group's Dynamics

The more significant problem in group decision-making is the
tendency toward increased conformity. See Kidd & Campbell, Conformity to Groups as a
Function of Group Success, 51 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 390 (1955).
143. See M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 284.
144. See A. HARE, supra note 83, at 23-24.
145. Ross, Bierbrauer & Hoffman, The Role ofAttribution Processes in Conformity and Dissent: Revisiting the Asch Situation, 31 AM. PSYCH. 148, 150 (1976).
146. M. SHAW, supra note 23, at 289.
147. Id (emphasis in original).
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pressure toward convergence of opinion, not unthinking conformity,
that occurs at some point during the decision-making process. A
large body of the recent group research indicates that groups tend to
become "solution-minded"; their goals of efficiency, success, and satisfaction speed up the decision-making process. The danger is that
the group will reach a unanimous, but incorrect, decision very early
in the process. 148
Contrary to folklore, the researchers find that the real difficulty is
in trying to slow groups down rather than trying to speed them up.
They use various terms to describe the dynamics of making the decision very shortly after the majority opinion begins to appear - "the
emerging consensus," "majority congruence," "group convergence,"
and "passing the adoption threshold." 149 In essence, members of the
group initially attack the problem in an open-minded and searching
manner, but when they sense which way the wind is blowing, they
proceed quickly to a decision.
Hoffman concluded that the first solution to pass what he calls
the "adoption threshold" wins and prevents others from emerging. 1so
At some point, the emergence of a majority becomes apparent to all,
and dissent turns to ambiguity and then to unity, with little or no
dissent. Group discussion and analysis serve continuously to anchor
the developing consensus. Bales, Bormann, and Fisher have each
confirmed the existence of this phenomenon. 1s1 Coupled with the
148. See Bamlund, supra note 32, at 59.
149. See, e.g., I. JANIS, supra note ll I, at 11, 198-206, 218-19 (strong concurrence-seeking
tendency); A. KOWITZ & T. KNUDSON, DECISION MAKING IN SMALL GROUPS 171-72 (1980)
(premature consensus); Hoffman, Friend & Bond, Problem JJ!lferences and the Process of
Adopting Group Solutions, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS 48, 64-65 (1979) (passing the adoption threshold).
150. ~ee Hoffman, Friend & Bond, supra note 149, at 64-65. See generally Hoffman, Applications lo the Functioning ofProblem-Solving Groups, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVINO PRO·
cESs 184-87 (1979). "[T]he adoption of [the ultimate] solution could be predicted at a
relatively early stage of the problem-solving discussion." Hoffman & Maier, Valence i11 the

Adoption of Solutions by Prob/em-Solving Groups: IL Quality and Acceptance as Goals of
Leaders and Members, in THE GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS 33, 33 (1979).
151. See E. BORMANN, DISCUSSION AND GROUP METHODS 282-83 (2d ed. 1975) (groups
do not proceed rationally in problem solving except to justify solution); Bales, Jn Co,!fere11ce,

HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1954, at 44; 49 (recommends reversing the order of formal parliamentary procedure for group problem solving by having the group deal in the following order
with: (I) what are pertinent facts? (2) how do group members feel about such facts? (3) what
shall be done in reference to problem?). Fisher, Decision Emergence: Phases in Group JJecision-Making, 37 SPEECH MoN. 53, 58-65 (1970) (discusses four stages of group decision-making). Some of the studies have literally dissected, minute by minute, the group decision-making process. For example, one study found that 22% of the time devoted to a problem involved
the initiation and development of one idea, 25% to the clarification of that idea and 25% to
confirmation of the idea; in other words, 72% of the group effort was aimed at anchoring the
first solution as the group solution. Larson, Speech Communication Research on Small Groups,
20 SPEECH TEACHER 89, 99 (1971). Another study found that the group attention span per
substantive ''theme" is only 76 seconds. Berg, A Descriptive Analysis of the JJistribution and
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group's disposition to finish the task - its "solution-mindedness" convergence or congruence may lead to decisions based on inadequate information and an inadequate search for alternatives.
Groups adopt only as many criteria as are needed to solve the problem, 152 and the group's discussion centers around the first apparently
reasonable solution. If enough cues reveal that a solution is acceptable, it becomes the group decision.
In their experiments with the NASA Moon Survival Problem, 153
Hall and Watson and Nemiroff found that the use of "intervention
techniques" to slow down "majority congruence" led to higher quality decision-making in certain groups than in groups in which the
usual group dynamics were at work. Hall and Watson, for example,
instructed certain groups of businesspersons to avoid taking an early
majority vote, to encourage differences of opinion, and to seek to
reach a "consensus." These "instructed" groups performed significantly better than the most proficient member of their group and
significantly better than the uninstructed groups. These studies
demonstrate that procedures aimed at slowing down the group dynamics and protecting the minority significantly improve the quality
of group decision-making.
3. Techniques for Slowing .Down the Group's .Dynamics

Experimenters have used many techniques to avoid the group's
rush to decision and to lessen conformity pressures. 154 Four techniques have received empirical support: (1) anonymous voting at
various stages of the decision process; (2) formalizing the role of
devil's advocate, and rotating the job at each meeting; (3) using a
"discussion leader" whose position on the issue is not known to the
group, instead of using a high-profile leader whose position is or
quickly becomes known to all; and (4) if the decision can wait, implementing a "second round review."
Duration
(1967).

of Themes

Discussed by Task-Oriented, Small Groups, 34 SPEECH MoN. 172, 174

152. See Hoffman, Bond & Falk, Valence far Criteria: A Preliminary Exploration, in THE
GROUP PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS (1979).
153. See notes 35-36 supra.
154. "Brainstorming" became a much used technique in the 1960's, thanks to its active
promotion by advertiser Osborn. Rules designed to facilitate creativity are imposed on the
group. Individuals are not allowed to criticize ideas suggested by other, but can only J?uild
upon them or suggest other ideas. The experimental results have been equivocal. However, at
least some of the apparent superiority of brainstorming groups may have.resulted merely from
the use of a decision-deferral technique, or from the superiority of participants. See A. HARE,
supra note 83, at 319; Parnes, Effects of E_xtended Ejfort in Creative Problem Solving, 52 J.
EDUC. PSYCH. 117 (1961).
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a. Anonymous voting by directors. Behavioral scientists have
tested empirically various forms of anonymous voting and have
found that such voting leads to higher quality group decisions than
disclosed voting. Anonymous voting obviously reduces conformity
pressures. And the various anonymous voting procedures structure
group decision-making, and thus counteract the rush to decide, although other structured or staged processes might also produce that
effect.
One structured process for anonymous voting - called the Nominal Group Technique - was devised by Van de Ven and
Delbecq. 155 A complex problem is posed to the group. Each individual is then given time to formulate an approach and possible solution without communicating it to the others. Then a structured
round-robin presentation by each member is made, one idea at a
time. Each idea is immediately summarized on a blackboard. The
group discusses the listed ideas to clarify and to evaluate them. This
proceeds for one or more rounds. Finally, members vote by secret
ballot and the majority decision becomes binding.
A computer age technique called the "Delphi Process," pioneered by Dalkey and Hammer, is the ultimate technique for preserving anonymity. 156 However, the new board cannot use it in its
stark form because the individuals comprising the "group" never
meet face-to-face. A very complex problem is posed. Members
communicate anonymously, either in writing or by computer. After
each member's first input is recorded and available to all, members
make second inputs, anonymously communicating questions and explanations in the process. This procedure continues until the group
reaches a consensus or a predetermined number of rounds have
occurred.
The researchers have tested these and other structured decision
procedures with anonymous voting. Although differing on various
155. See Van de Ven & Dell?ecq, 'fhe Effectiveness oj Nominal .Delphi and Interacting
Group .Decision Making Processes, 17 AcAD. MGT. J. 605 (1974). For other similar studies, see
Felsenthal & Fuchs, supra note 34; Green, An Empirical Analysis oj Nominal and Interacting
Groups, 18 AcAD. MGT. J. 63 (1975) (contradicts Van de Ven and Delbecq on superiority of
nominal over interacting groups); Stumpf, Freedman & Zand, Judgmental .Decisions: A Study
oj Interactions Among Group Membership, Group Functioning, and the .Decision Situation, 22
AcAD. MoT. J. 765, 779-80 (1979) (summarizes the conflicting evidence, and suggests, on the
basis of a later experiment reported in the article, that when "the decision requires quality and
originality, interacting groups are likely to recommend less effective decisions" than nominal
groups); Stumpf, Zand & Freedman, .Designing Groups far Judgmental .Decisions, 4 AcAD,
MoT. REv. 589 (1979).
156. Dalkey & Hammer, An Experimental Application oj the .Delphi Method to the Use oj
Experts, 9 MGT. SCI. 458 (1963). See Felsenthal & Fuchs, supra note 34; Reed, On the .Dynamics ojGroup .Decision-making in High Places, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1978, at 49.
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other points, they have concluded that the anonymity aspect of the
various techniques leads to higher-quality group decisions.
The courts, therefore, should allow the new board to experiment
with secret voting. Present liability rules applicable to the individual
directors may leave some room for anonymous voting, at least for all
"votes" prior to the "official" final decision that is duly recorded in
the minutes. Indeed, current law might permit experimentation with
anonymous voting on the fo_rmal final decision. The anonymous dissenting directors later faced with a lawsuit based on the majority's
actions might well object to such a procedure. But it is not even
clear today whether a formal dissenting vote, without resignation or
steps taken to prevent damage from the majority decision, will insulate a dissenter from liability. 157 In any event, such stark situations
are rare in the boardroom, and the uniform use of the secret ballot
by the new board appears, on balance, worthy of' serious
consideration. 158
b. The chief executive as chairperson? Another approach that
the researchers have empirically confirmed as effective in upgrading
the quality of group decisions is the "discussion leader'' technique) 59
One person, designated the discussion leader, cannot express his-or
her own views, but must stimulate participation by all, encourage
questions, and protect any emerging minority. Janis and Marrn
strongly recommend the technique, stating that it allows the group
"the opportunity to develop an atmosphere of open inquiry and ,to
157. Fletcher states: ''To protest is not alone sufficient to excuse a director. Ifhe does no
more than protest he is liable as much as ifhe had acquiesced in the transaction. But protests
followed by affirmative action will suffice." 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 1058 (1975) (footnotes omitted). See DePinto v. Provident Security
Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37, 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967) (director who resigned
just before corporation was looted held liable for negligence; had he learned of the fraudulent
looting plan in time (as he should have), then "armed with such information, it would have
been [the director's] duty to decline [the] request that he resign as a director. Continuing as a
director . . . would have enabled [him] actively to oppose the proposal before the board and, if
necessary, draw the matter to the attention of stockholders . . . and . . . of state regulatory
officials."); Joyce, .Director of Corporations, DIRECTORS & BOARDS ;; 1, Summer 1979, at 53-54.
Cf. Heit v. Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967) (lack of protest by a director made him
liable as collaborator with other directors); Walker v. Man, 142 Misc. 277, 281-82, 253 N.Y.S.
458, 465 (Sup. Ct. 193 I) (failure by director to protest or correct an illegal transaction
equivalent to acquiesence for liability purposes).
158. One company that makes it easier for directors to ask questions is Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. There the directors put questions in writing anonymously prior
to the meeting. See Scheibla, Heat on .Directors: A Revolution is Occurring in the Boardroom,
BARRON'S, July 30, 1979, at 4, 27.
159. See Maier & Solem, The Contribution ofa .Discussion Leader to the Quality of Group
Thinlcing: The Effective Use of Minority Opinions, 5 HUMAN REL. 277 (1952).
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explore impartially a wide range of policy alternatives." 160 An announcement of the leader's position colors the decisions of both the
group and the leader. After persons have publicly committed themselves to a choice, they are likely to evaluate contrary communications in a biased manner. 161
This empirical evidence suggests that the chief executive, who
usually places items on the board's agenda and is committed to a
specific course of action, should not also serve as chairperson of the
board. Acting solely as a director, the chief executive can expect the
board to give due weight to his views in any event. However, only
seven percent of the very largest companies and twenty-five percent
of 1,300 large companies have seen fit to separate the roles of chief
executive and chairperson.162
c. Directors as rotating devil's advocates. The new board should
also consider formalizing the position of devil's advocate. 163 Janis 164
strongly recommends assigning the role of devil's advocate to members of the group on a rotating basis.1 65 As envisioned by Janis, the
group leader will have to give each member "an unambiguous assignment to present his arguments as cleverly and convincingly as he
can, like a good lawyer, challenging the testimony of those advocating the majority position." 166 A recent empirical study indicated
that the devil's advocate technique slows convergence by the majority and may generate more alternative solutions. 167
Directors may be loath to adopt or implement enthusiastically
the devil's advocate procedure because it exposes them to greater
risks of liability: if a directorial decision is later challenged in court,
information developed by the devil's advocate would become the
plaintiff's starting point. But strengthening the business judgment
160. I. JANIS & L. MANN, DECISION MAKING 399 (1977) (quoting I. JANIS, supra note 111,
at 211).
161. See id at 182.
162. See KORN/FERRY 1980, supra note 6, at 3.
163. See I. JANIS,supra note 111, at 218-19; I. JANIS & L. MANN,supra note 160, at 397-98;
J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 338-39. Both Janis and Steinbruner have made detailed
historical studies of high-level governmental decision-making.
164. See I. JANIS, supra note 11 I, at 218-19; J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 338-39, also
mentions the technique.
165. See I. JANIS, supra note 111, at 216. Janis and Mann note that the board must provide the rotating devil's advocate with sufficient resources and staff in advance of the meeting
in order to perform this role effectively. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 398.
166. I. JANIS, supra note 111, at 215.

161. See Herbert & Estes, Improving Exectftive IJecisions by Formalizing IJissent: The Corporate IJevil's Advocate, 2 AcAD. MGT. REv. 662, 666 (1977).
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defense for independent directors, as this Article recommends,
should at least partially allay such fears.
d. The second-round review. When time permits, the board can
postpone a decision until its next meeting. Alfred Sloan did just
that, and Janis recommends the procedure. 168 Postponement is an
intuitively sound way to reduce pressures toward conformity and the
rush to decide, and the procedure has also received some empirical
confirmation. 169 Although the group literature suggests many other
techniques for slowing down the decision-making process, 170 this
writer has not found empirical support for them.
4. The Courts Should Encourage the Use of "Stop-and-Think"
Procedures by the Board
Although we know very little about the decision-making
processes used by the typical board of a large corporation, there is
little reason to suppose that a group of directors is exempt from the
conformity pressures found in the many groups observed in the laboratory and in the field by behavioral scientists. Because businesspersons typically attempt to get jobs done as quickly and efficiently as
possible, there is also no reason to suppose that the new board is any
less solution-minded than other groups. 171 Finally, there is little reason to expect that the new board - a group composed of very busy
individuals, highly-compensated for their other main activities ·will readily adopt time consuming procedures aimed at reducing the
pressures toward conformity and quick decisions at board meetings.
Consequently, the courts should provide positive legal incentives to
encourage the new board to adopt one or more of the empirically
confirmed "stop-and-think" procedures.
Corporate law strongly emphasizes the board's decison-making
process. After reviewing the Delaware decisions, for example, Arsht
concluded:
The business judgment rule was not conceived as a defense that, once
asserted, precluded judicial inquiry into the procedures and methodologies followed by the directors in making their challenged decision.
. . . [I]n each case the business judgment rule [expressed by the court]
was a starting point for inquiry into the ~ectors' decisionmaking
168. See I. JANIS, supra note lll, at 218-19.
169. See B. BASS, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 388-92 (1965).
170. See notes 167-68 supra. See generally I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160; A.
supra note 149; M. SHAW, supra note 23.

KOWITZ & T. KNUDSON,

171. R. MUELLER, NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DIRECTORS 11 (1978).
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process. 172
At least two "process-of-decision" provisos limit the use of the business judgment rule as a shield to judicial inquiry on the merits of a
business decision. At the most mundane level, a director ordinarily
must attend the meeting to share information and ideas necessary to
render a decision. An early Delaware case_ is illustrative: "If not
present in person to give out, or receive, business knowledge needed
in conducting the affairs of the company . . . [the director] has not
performed his duty, because he has not in fact participated in the
deliberations of the board." 173 The directors must also have adequate information to exercise business judgment. As Judge Hand
observed in Dames, directors have a "duty to keep themselves informed in some detail, and it is this duty which the defendant in my
judgment failed adequately to perform." 174 The courts have given a
mixed reception to this informational prerequisite to the exercise of
business judgment, but it appears to be backed by the weight of the
authority. It is supported by decisions in the leading corporate states
of Delaware and New York, and by statute in California. 175 A New
York court put this process point well: "When courts say that they
will not interfere in matters of business judgment, it is presupposed
that judgment reasonable diligence has in fact been
exercised." 176
172. Arsht, supra note 54, at 100.
173. Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 11 Del. Ch. 80, 89, 95 A. 895, 899 (1915). See also
Stevens v. Acadia Dairies, 15 Del. Ch. 248, 135 A. 846 (1927) (directors cannot act by proxy).
Decisions requiring that notices of special meetings be sent to directors and that the notice set
forth the precise agenda can be viewed as first-step process rules for decision-making. See W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 165-66, for collected cases and statutes. Statutes
permit participation by telephone when "all persons participating in the meeting can hear each
other . . . ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(i) (1974). However, if the directors unanimously
consent in writing to a decision, they need not meet to discuss the action. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 14l(f) (1974).
174. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614,615 (2d Cir. 1924). However, the defendant was held
not liable because the plaintiff did not prove that the defendant's failure to become informed
caused the damage.
"This duty of attention is becoming increasingly important as additional emphasis is
placed on the director's monitoring role." STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 663 (footnote
omitted).
175. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 16, at 663-64. The California statute requires that a
director carry out his or her duties ''with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would under similar circumstances." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 309(a) (West 1977). In Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,863 (C.D. Cal. 1976), Royal sought to buy Sar, a competitor of Monogram, so as to ward off Monogram's tender offer for Royal. The court enjoined the purchase of Sar, noting, among other factors, that the transaction was created in
extreme haste and without reasonable investigation by Royal. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. at 91, 139-40.
176. Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944). In Kaplan v. Centex Corp.,
284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971), the court said: "Application of the [business judgment] rule

November 1981]

The New Board

45

Under some recent decisions it is unclear whether proof that the
directors were present and informed ends the inquiry or whether
there is still another process-of-decision proviso to the business judgment rule - that the board actually deliberated before reaching its
business decision. Certain decisions in Delaware seem to support
the latter process inquiry. In Lutz v. Boas, 177 the Delaware Chancery Court held the directors were liable because they had "made no
efforts to be informed" 178 and "gave almost automatic approval" 179
to certain agreements.
In a more recent case, Gimbel v. Signal Co. ,180 the Delaware
Chancery Court preliminarily enjoined Signal's sale of a subsidiary
for an apparently grossly inadequate price. A board meeting to discuss the sale was called on very short notice, and the outside directors were not notified of the meeting's purposes. The court reviewed
a handwritten memorandum and handwritten minutes to evaluate
the decision-making process. After two hours of discussion, the directors approved a $480,000,000 transaction. The court noted that
"the meeting was short for a transaction of this size . . . ." 181 It
discussed a number of factors suggesting imprudence, including
management's failure to give the board adequate advance notice of
its prolonged negotiations, the board's failure seriously to consider
certain views on the legality of the sale, the failure to delay the sale
to provide adequate time for board consideration or to obtain an
updated evaluation, the failure to consider how the corporation
... depends upon a showing that informed directors did, in fact, make a business judgment
authorizing the transaction under review."
The federal courts under the federal securities laws, particularly § 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933 and under the proxy rules under§ 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
have also imposed substantial "due diligence" duties upon directors. In Gould v. American
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853 (D. Del. 1972), vacatedonotltergrounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3d
Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit held outside directors liable for negligence in failing to review
carefully a proxy statement sent to shareholders. The court said: "When possible, the . . .
[statute] should be interpreted to afford incentives to directors to undertake active and rigorous
scrutiny of corporate activities...•" 351 F. Supp. at 859. The federal cases are concerned
with the procedures used by the directors in seeking out and evaluating information for public
disclosure under federal law. The Investment Company Act of 1940 requires that at least 40%
of a mutual fund board consist of independent directors. In a number of cases under that Act,
the courts have required that the board engage in ''meaningful" inquiry and decision-making.
See Cambridge Fund, Inc. v. Abella, 501 F. Supp. 598 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), and cases collected
therein. In Cambridge Fund, the Court found that the proposed indemnification of an interested party was presented to the board "in such a one-sided and incomplete manner that it
discouraged any meaningful evaluation by the unaffiliated directors."
177. 39 Del. Ch. 585, 171 A.2d 381 (Ch. 1961).
178. 39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 396.
179. 39 Del. Ch. at 609, 171 A.2d at 395.
180. 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), ajfd on other grounds, 316 A.2d 619 (1974).
181. 316.A.2d at 613.
,
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would use the sale proceeds, and the indication in the "limited record [of] a gross disparity between the fair market value" of the subsidiary and the sale price. 182 Although the court said that "the
ultimate question is not one of method but one of value," 183 the case
serves as a possible precedent for examination of the board's decision-making process.
Judicial inquiry into the processes of board decision-making has
also gone beyond the "directors must be informed" condition in the
recent take-over cases that have granted the business judgment defense to the target corporation's board. This type of in-depth inquiry
into processes may be peculiar to the take-over area because the substantive rules all touch upon the subjective motivations of the target
board (e.g., whether the "sole," "principal," or "primary" motive of
the board was the improper one of seeking to perpetuate its control
for its own sake). 184 But the courts might extend the process inquiry
to other types of business decisions, under the "bad faith" exception
to the business judgment rule. As the Second Circuit recently stated,
"directors are presumed to have acted properly and in good faith,
and are called to account for their actions only when they are shown
to have engaged in self-dealing or fraud, or to have acted in bad
faith." 185 Plaintiffs could argue that failure to deliberate or merely
rubber stamping the recommendations of the chief executive is bad
faith .
.· In any event, the process of decision figured prominently in the
lengthy facts recited and the reasoning of the courts in recent takeover cases. In Treadway Cos. v. Care Corporation, 186 Care sought to
acquire Treadway. Treadway successfully warded off Care, the unwanted suitor, by merging with a ''white knight" of Treadway's own
choosing, Fair Lanes. At the conclusion of its lengthy opinion granting the business judgment defense to the Treadway board (except for
Lieblich, Treadway's President), the Second Circuit observed:
[T]here was evidence that the directors did in fact exercise their independent judgment. . . .
The record as to what steps the Treadway directors took, and exactly what iµformation they sought, preparatory to the exercise of their
182. 316.A.2d at 614-15.
183. 316 A.2d at 615.
184. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980).
185. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,382 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiffs would have
a potential opening wedge in all cases: They need depositions of directors regarding the decision process to make the good or bad faith determination. Failing to deliberate or merely
rubber-stamping the chief executive, they could assert, is bad faith.
186. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
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judgment is somewhat sparse. Care would have us believe they did
nothing. A close reading of the record, however, reveals tp.at they had
engaged an investment banking firm [Swordco] to negotiate and help
them evaluate proposed mergers; that between meetings of the Treadway board they . . . were informed of negotiations with Fair Lanes;
that during the negotiations they sent Swordco to Fair Lanes armed
with a number of questions to which they wished answers; that they
asked Swordco for pro forma balance sheets for the combined company; that they adjourned their deliberations for one week thereafter to
reflect on the information they had received and to obtain more; and
that they conditioned their approval of the proposed transactions on
obtaining an opinion from Swordco that the transactions were fair to
Treadway.
Thus the record provides no adequate basis for finding that Care
carried its burden of proving that the directors did not exercise their
judgment in good faith or that any other circumstances make the business judgment rule inapposite. 18 7

Treadway seems to have equated "good faith" with keeping an open

mind, seeking outside advice when critical to a decision, and adjourning for a second-round review when time permits.
In Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 188 Crouse-Hinds had negotiated a merger with Belden Corporation before the unwanted
suitor, InterNorth, came upon the scene. Crouse-Hinds stoutly resisted the new suitor and merged with Belden. The Second Circuit
granted the business judgment defense to the Crouse-Hinds board.
The court detailed the decision-making process just before and at the
critical meeting of the Crouse-Hinds board, when the board decided
to resist InterNorth's tender offer and to reaffirm its prior decision to
merge with Belden. The court emphasized that the Crouse-Hinds
board was "advised not to formulate conclusions," had consulted
"its expert advisers," and relied "in part" on the opinion of its
financial adviser in its decision. The court held that plaintiff had
failed to rebut the presumption under the business judgment rule
that the board had acted properly and in good faith. 189
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. , 190 the Seventh Circuit recently
187. 638 F.2d at 384 (footnotes omitted). In a footnote to the above, the Court said:
Care has also argued, and persuaded the district court, that bad faith should be inferred
from the haste with which the Treadway-Fair Lanes negotiations proceeded, and from the
very terms agreed to, which Care asserts grossly disadvantaged Treadway. We see nothing in the course of the board's deliberations, nor in the agreements themselves, that
would permit the drawing of such an inference with regard to the directors other than
Lieblich.
638 F.2d at 384 n.53.
188. 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). See text at notes 67-69 supra.
189. 634 F.2d at 702.
190. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). See text at notes 66-68 supra.
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protected the target board of Marshall Field from liability to its own
stockholders for successfully opposing takeover efforts by Carter
Hawley Hale, the national retail chain. The court had to summarize
the decisional process rather superficially because it affirmed the
lower court's directed verdict for the director defendants at the close
of the plaintifrs case. It tersely indicated that the "presumption of
good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened when the
majority of the board consists of independent outside directors." 191
The court stated: "[b]ecause our examination of the board's conduct
does not reveal . . . bad faith, we do not believe an evaluation of the
fairness or wisdom of the board's conduct is called for as long as it
can be attributed to any rational business purpose." 192 Although its
opinion is unclear, the court seemed to be referring to the process of
decision, in which the board consulted with counsel and investment
bankers. 193
The board's consultation with outside experts before making a
decision has been held a factor in other cases granting the business
judgment defense to directors; 194 conversely, some courts have cited
the failure to consult experts as evidence of a failure to exercise business judgment. 195 A board's plan to "paper up" a decision previously reached by seeking an expert opinion will not always work. In
one takeover case, the court disregarded the hastily prepared report
of an investment banker on the ground the board had not in fact
relied on it. 196
These cases are consistent with an actual deliberation or "stopand-think" requirement in the business judgment rule, with the burden of proof on the plaintiff. "Good faith" could thus become the
rubric for imposing on the board a "stop-and-think" rule for all
191. 646 F.2d at 294.
192. 646 F.2d at 295 n.7.
193. 646 F.2d at 279-80.
194. See Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (reliance on
investment banker's report that tender offer price was inadequate); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494,507, 199 A.2d 548,566 (Del. 1964) (reliance on Dunn & Bradstreet report and advice
of investment bankers); GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 6155 (Del. Ch. April 30,
1980) (unreported opinion) (tender offerer sought denial of temporary restraining order to
prevent target corporation from selling its major asset; target's consultation with investment
bankers was cited by the Chancellor as evidence that the directors had exercised their business
judgment in good faith); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (reliance
upon advice of investment bankers in setting price of stock repurchased from dissident
shareholder).
195. See Pitt & Israel, Recent Cases Chart Use OfBusiness Judgment Rule, Legal Times of
Washington, Jan. 19, 1981, at 35.
196. Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) ~ 95,863, at 91,135-36 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
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business decisions. Whether the courts should apply this developing
"process-of-decision" law to the new board is a difficult question. A
"stop-and-think" rule would encourage independent directors to
"lift themselves up by their own psychological bootstraps," 197 and to
seek to avoid pressures toward conformity and quick decisions. But
such a rule would allow plaintiffs to enter the boardroom too easily,
fishing for substance under the guise of process. The incentives for
independent directors to serve are fragile as it is. Given the overriding goal of encouraging truly independent directors to serve and to
participate actively, the courts should strengthen the business judgment defense applicable to such directors, not weaken it by adding
further uncertainties to its invocation.
The courts can create an incentive for the adoption of "stop-andthink" procedures by closing the boardroom door upon a showing by
an independent board that (1) the chief executive is not chairperson
of the board; or (2) the board .uses the devil's advocate technique; or
(3) voting at various stages of the decision-making process is anonymous; or (4) the board made the particular decision at a "second
round" review. 198 Other techniques could be added to the list as
they receive empirical support. And, if the new board sought outside
advice prior to making the particular decision, a court could foreclose further inquiry into the process of decision, as in Panter. Such
consultation makes the independent directors stop and think as
much as the confirmed techniques. It has especial application in the
takeover cases, where target boards uniformly consult outside counsel and investment bankers despite the pressures for a quick and uniform response by the directors. 199
Even this somewhat superficial process-of-decision rule would
flush out evidence as to whether the board has any "stop-and-think"
procedure whatsoever. But once the new board has come forward
with such evidence, the court will have to close the boardroo~ door;
otherwise the plaintiff will try to fish for substance while challenging
the bona jides of the process.200
197. R. MUELLER, mpra note 171, at 11.
198. The "simple" showing would involve testimony by an independent director that the
new board regularly uses one of the procedures and in fact used it in the process of making the
challenged business decision. The second round review is an exception to the suggestion of
proof of regular use.
199. A recent SEC rule requires the board to respond to a tender offer within ten business
days after it is made. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1980).
200. The proposed rule is "superficial" in the sense that the new board can merely "go
through the motions" at meetings simply to get the benefits proposed. The devil's advocate,
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THE NEW BOARD AS BUSINESS-DECIDER

This section of the Article uses the empirical findings already discussed and other recent literature on decision-making to sketch a
tentative framework for allocating decision-making between the new
board and the chief executive in the large corporation. The evidence
indicates that, all things being equal, peer group decisions will qualitatively surpass those made by individuals. On this basis, this Article
has argued that the law should protect as strongly as possible the
decisions of that important and new peer group in the very large
corporation - the board composed of a majority of independent directors. A nearly absolute business judgment defense for the new
board would not only encourage the board to make important decisions; it would also provide incentives for truly independent direcfor example, could regularly be a sheep in wolfs clothing by implicit agreement among group
members.
Any process rule is subject to manipulation, particularly by persons who face potential
liability. If courts require board meetings to be tape recorded, would the directors wink or use
hand signals? If they require board meetings to be videotaped, would the directors informally
meet and thereafter conduct the formal meeting as television actors would? Many legal rules
are imposed despite the high potential for evasion, because most people will comply with
them. Further, the affected persons include businesspersons, government officials, and academics. Most are honest and responsible individuals, who will refuse to evade a procedure
which both the law has embraced and the members have decided is best designed to reduce the
very pressures of which they are aware. Further, once an ongoing group develops a procedure
it rarely deviates from it. For example, if the board selected the rotating devil's advocate
procedure it would slowly but surely incorporate the role as part of its "culture" or "norms."
Each member would experience the role, and the group itself would be exposed to it meeting
after meeting.
A more direct approach might be ''to activate the board of directors" to adopt one of the
techniques by mandating disclosure, under the federal proxy rules, of the decisional procedures used by the board. This idea derives from several unrelated proposals of Professors
Elliot J. Weiss and Donald E. Schwartz. Weiss & Schwartz, Using JJisc/osure lo Activate the
Board ofJJirectors, LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., Summer 1977, at 63; Weiss & Schwartz, .Disclosure Approachfar JJirectors, HARV. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 1978, at 18; Weiss & Schwartz, Using
JJisc/osure lo Activate the Board of .Directors, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GovERNANCE AND REFORM 109 (D. DeMott ed. 1980) (updated version of their previous articles).
Under the proxy rules (or the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act), the SEC could require
the board to disclose whether it utilizes one of the empirically recognized techniques or another technique reasonably designed to accomplish the same purposes. However, proxy state•
ments are cluttered as it is and costly and shareholders of large corporations may not be
interested in this kind of information. The SEC should therefore give the new board time to
choose decision-making procedures or decide not to impose new federal burdens on it. A
possible alternative would be legislating process rules. Professor Christopher D. Stone has
recently analyzed the efficacy of achieving corporate control through various types of liability
rules. This author's suggestion that the process rules be imposed only indirectly and at the
instance of a shareholder in a derivative suit (in Stone's phrase a "harm-based liability rule")
may be less efficacious in inducing the adoption of such rules generally (and may be more
costly) than the adoption of "standards," presumably through legislation. See Stone, The
Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J. I, 41 (1980)
(submitting that monitoring and enforcement costs could be reduced by adopting
"standards").
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tors to serve, and might encourage those companies that do not have
a majority of such directors to reach at least that goal.
The peer group superiority evidence also supports the corollary
argument that, all other things being equal, the chief executive
should make fewer decisions. And other recent evidence further indicates that the chief executive should refer decisions to the board
whenever practicable. This recent evidence, from the cognitive psychologists, pierces the mystique of individual intuitive and cognitive
skills and leads to somewhat pessimistic conclusions. The individual's capacities for processing information and making decisions are
more limited and error-prone than had previously be~n supposed.
The same research also indicates that all individuals - especially
the chief executive -have "cognitive conceit": they are unwilling to
recognize their natural limitations. 201 As Dr. Harlan Meal, then a
manager for the preeminent business consultant Arthur D. Little,
has observed: "Very few executives think of themselves as gamblers
or of making the best kind of decisions in a gambling situation.
They want, instead, to think of themselves as individuals whose
greater grasp of the available information and whose greater insight
remove the uncertainty from the ~ituation."202 This widely-shared
article of faith poses its own dangers.
A framework for allocating decision-making in- the very large
corporation must also take into account the work of the scholars of
organizations and bureaucracies. Those scholars have ably demonstrated that all things are not equal in the real world of the large
corporation. Substantial time and informational constraints impede
ideal decision-making by both the chief executive and the board.
Any allocation between the_ two must recognize those types of decisions that the board, as a practical matter, cannot :µiake. These organizational and pracd.cal considerations even foreclose the chief
executive from making many. ~ajor decisions. The development of
autonomous divisions in many. of the very large corporations, with
each division a separate "profit center'' under the management of a
different senior executive, has radicaUy changed the .functions of the
chief executive. The chief executive of such a corporation now
serves as a board of directors, advising and monitoring the divisional
chiefs, subject to the same informational constraints. on decisions as
201. This is the classic "double-bind." Dawes, who presents the most pessimistic version,
coined the term "cognitive conceit": our limited cognitive capacity is such that it prevents us
from being aware of its limited nature. See Dawes, Shallow Psychology, in COGNITION AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3 (1976).
202. Brown, .Do Managers Find .Decision Theory Useful?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
1970, at 78, 86.
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the board. 203
Given the superiority of the new board over the chief executive
in decision-making, a re-examination of the functions of each is in
order. In the divisionalized large corporation, the new board could
assume responsibility for decision areas in which the chief executive
now exclusively operates, subject to the same informational constraints that the chief executive now confronts. But the limited
amount of time available to independent directors and the absence
of time constraints on the chief executive demand that the new board
take over only a few decision-making categories. In addition to the
traditional decisions that the law requires the board to make, such as
mergers and stock issuances, the board should: (1) make all longterm and strategic planning decisions; (2) fix the annual corporate
budget and allocate funds among the various divisions or departments; (3) fix the standards of compensation for all executives; and
(4) make those decisions placed before the chief executive that involve stark or "all-or-none" choices, unless an immediate decision is
required, and the board or an independent board committee is unavailable. This list should not, however, obscure the main point of
the findings: All other things being equal (and the organization usually imposes equal informational constraints on both the board and
the chief executive), the board and not the chief executive should be
encouraged to make business decisions.
The first three items are part of emerging trends, and their inclusion is neither radical nor new. A recent survey of Fortune 500 directors pointed to annual plans and budgets for the corporation and
long-range corporate plans as some of the new board's most important information needs. 204 Establishing compensation standards has
been the principal work of the independent compensation committee
for quite a while. 205 The fourth item, involving stark choices, may
203. A Wall Street Journal article about Thomas A. Murphy, the recently retired chairman
and chief executive of General Motors, stated:
Mr. Murphy suggests that the power of the chairman of GM is in part illusory, that
GM's management system almost dictates important decisions be made before they arrive
for formal approval at the top, and that the company is nearly as self-governing as a
Cadillac on cruise control.
. . . . Mr. Murphy jokes that the main decisions he makes are ''what time to get up
and whether to go to church." He says that all subjects at scheduled meetings are carefully worked over by staffers and scrutinized by committees beforehand. By the time he
sees the material, he says, "the data suggest the decision" and he often just concurs.
Top Men al General Motors Look al Their Jobs, Wall St. J., Sept. 16, 1980, at 33, col. 3.
204. See Shanklin & Ryans, supra note 19, 24. Another recent survey of directors found
that most directors already think that long-range planning for the company is an important
part of their job. See THE NEW DIRECTOR, supra note 12, at 20, 21, 29, 32.
205. See note 6 supra;

THE NEW DIRECTOR,

supra note 12, at 21.
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well represent the types of decisions that the chief executive today
does present to the new board, if only for sage advice from the directors on "high-stress" decisions. 206
The law can provide the incentives for the board to make more
decisions in these four areas by strengthening the board's business
judgment defense. With this almost absolute protection accorded to
board decisions, the board will probably delegate fewer major decision areas to the chief executive than in the past. At the same time,
the courts can encourage the chief executive to advise the board on a
timely basis of the major decisions required to be made. Professor
Weber has referred to the "fait accompli" problem. The board must
instruct the chief executive to report on ongoing projects, not just
accomplished projects. Otherwise the chief executive
will tend to report to the board only those aspects of corporate activities which have reached a consensus stage, eliminating from his progress report any information in evolution or in question due to changes
in the corporation's internal life or environment. Yet it is precisely this
kind of information which can indicate to the director whether or not
s/he needs to assume the decision-maker's role. 207

The courts can ensure the timely provision of this essential information by exploiting the present ambiguity in the applicability of the
business judgment rule to important decisions made by the chief executive without meaningful prior consultation with the board, or by
directly applying agency law to the duties of the chief executive to
the new board.
A. .Decision-Making by Individuals

It has long been recognized that the individual has a "bounded
rationality," 208 and recent :findings show that the individual's cogni206. Psychologists have found that the best decision-making occurs with "moderate" stress
levels. See I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 51; Zander & Medow, Strength ofgroup and
desire far attainable group aspirations, 33 J. PERSONALITY 122 (1965).
207. Weber,Advise or .Decide: Corporate Identity Crises and the .Director's .Decision-Making
Role, DIRECTORS & BOARDS,, Fall 1979, at 52, 53 (citation omitted). Louis W. Cabot concurs:
"Present important issues to directors before, not after, management has taken a firm position." Cabot, On an Effective Board, 54 HARV. Bus. R.Ev. Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 46. Professor
A.M. Weimer polled "over forty corporate directors with long records of service" and reports:
"Many board members believe that they are not brought into the decision-making process at
an early enough stage. In some cases they are simply called upon to ratify the decisions that
management has already reached or decisions that have, for practical purposes, been made by
the executive committee." Weimer, Corporate Boards: Improving Their Job Perfonnance, 22
Bus. HORIZONS, June 1979, at 28, 28, 31.
208. See R. CYERT & J. MAR.CH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 10 (1963) (order in
which environment is searched largely determines the decisions that will be made); I. JANIS &
L. MANN, supra note 160, at 15 (vulnerability to gross errors in arriving at a decision through
superficial search and biased information processing); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 138-42, 169-71 (1958) (authors describe the effect of the boundaries of rationality on
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tive capacities are severely limited. The average individual can process an average of five to seven information "chunks" at any one
time in making a decision. 209 And each individual has systematic
methods for processing, storing, and retrieving information. We call
these "points of view," or use other euphemistic terms for what is in
essence a·severe limitation on individual capacity.
In the business world, behavioral scientists have identified at
least four cognitive or "mental" approaches by chief executives to
making major corporate decisions. 210 These approaches are not different management philosophies, but radically different ways of seeing the world and making decisions. They range from the purely
intuitive chief executive to the very systematic and detail-oriented
boss. Free market economists might urge that cognitive style, like
other variables, enters into the efficient fit of the proper chief executive with the particular successful corporation. This may be so, but
let us explore further.
In addition to vastly different cognitive styles, individuals rely
upon a limited number of intuitive principles to simplify the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting events when making judgments under uncertainty - the very essence of business
decisions. When used by an able and intelligent individual, these
principles are highly economical and usually effective, but they lead
to systematic errors.211 These findings are but a small part of the
recent empirical assault by behavioral scientists upon the intuitive
organizational structu_re); J. STEINBRUNER, supra note 43, at 130-32, 136 (author describes and
gives examples of the cognitive dimensions of political and organizational phenomena); Pfeffer, Power and Resource Allocation in Organizations, in PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 278, 280-83 (B. Staw ed. 1977) (man desires to be rational and is
rational within the limits of his cognitive capabilities); Suedfield, supra note 43, at 209 (1978)
(decision-making under high information loads tends to become stereotyped); Mayhew & Levinger, On the Emergence of Oligarchy in Human Interaction, 81 AM. J. Soc. 1017, 1021 (1976)
(humans cannot simultaneously conceptualize an array of more than five to nine significant
events from recent experience); von Holstein, Probability Encoding in Practice, in THE ROLE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THEORIES OF DECISION IN PRACTICE 148, 150 (D. White & K. Bowen
eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & BOWEN]. Cf. Johnson, Co'!flict Avoidance Through
Acceptable J)ecisions, 27 HUMAN REL. 71 (1974) (top management makes the second best decisions in order to increase certainty and reduce interpersonal friction). One review of the findings on the cognitive limitations of individuals states that "decision makers utilize information
primarily to reinforce - not change - their predispositions toward the information and alternatives available." Robertson, supra note 125, at 168 (emphasis in original).
209. See Mayhew & Levinger, supra note 208, at 1021-22.
210. See McKenny & Keen, How Managers' Minds Work, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
1974, at 79, 80-81, 83 (identifying managers as systematic thinkers, intuitive thinkers, receptive
thinkers, preceptive thinkers). See generally B. BASS, ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 388-90
(1965) (differences in personality and position held cause managers to view the same problem
in different ways).
211. More simply put, "individuals get into ruts in their thinking." Maier, Assets and Liabilities in Group Problem Solving, in READINGS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 163 (1979).
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and cognitive abilities of the individual. 212
These scientists have shown, for example, that most individuals
misinterpret highly relevant evidence in making intuitive judgments.
Imagine an um filled with balls, of which two thirds are one color
and one third another. X has drawn five balls from the um and
found that four were red and one was white. Y has drawn twenty
balls and found that twelve were red and eight were white. Which of
the two individuals should feel more confident that the um contains
two-thirds red and one-third white balls rather than the opposite? Y
should feel twice as confident as X. But research findings indicate
that most individuals select X. Many individuals intuitively feel that
the smaller sample provides stronger evidence that the um is
predominantly red because the proportion of red balls is larger in the
smaller sample than in the larger one.213
Behavioral scientists have also found that individuals are "often
confident in predictions that are quite likely to be off the mark." 214
For example, most individuals tend to overestimate the probability
that chain or sequentially related events will occur.215 Intuitively,
these individuals harbor unwarranted optimism that each of a- series.
of very likely events necessary to a successful result will occur, even
if the number of events is large.216 The development of a new product is an example.217 And, many individuals tend to underestimate
the probability that nonsequential or "disjunctive" events will occur. 218 A complex system will malfunction if any of its key elements
fails. Although the likelihood of failure of any key element is slight,
212. See, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
185 SCIENCE l 124 (1974).
213. Id at 1125.
214. Id at 1126. See Tversky & Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic far Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCH. 207 (1973).
215. See Bar-Hillel, 9 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR - HUMAN PERFORMANCE 396 (1973),.
cited in Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1128-29.
216. See Cohen, Chesnick & Haran, 63 BRIT. J. PSYCH. 41 (1972), cited in Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1129 n.10.
217. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 212, at 1129.
218. Id This has been confirmed in studies of choice among gambles and of judgments of
probability. In one study, individuals had to bet on one of two events. Three types of events
were used in mixes of two at a time: (i) drawing a red marble from a bag containing an equal
number of red and white marbles (probability is .50); (ii) drawing a red marble seven times in
a row from a bag containing nine times as many red as white marbles (probability is .48); or
(iii) drawing a red marble at least once in seven tries from a bag containing nine times as many
white as red marbles (probability is .52). After each draw, the marble was placed back in the
bag. The subjects preferred to bet on (ii) rather than (i), and preferred to bet on (i) rather than
(iii). Thus, most preferred to bet on the less likely event in both cases, having overestimated
the likelihood that sequentially related events would occur (the preference of (ii) over (i)), and
underestimated the likelihood that nonsequential events would occur (the preference of (i)
over (iii)). Id
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the probability of malfunction can be high if the system contains
many elements. Although presumably aware of Murphy's law, these
individuals intuitively underestimate the probabilities of failure of
complex systems.219
According to Janis and Mann, psychologists and others are
directing more effort toward elucidating hitherto unexplored flaws and
limitations in human information processing, such as the propensity of
decision makers to be distracted by irrelevant aspects of the alternatives, which leads to loose predictions about outcomes . . . the tendency of decision makers to be swayed by the form in which
information about risks is packaged and presented . . . their reliance
on faulty categories and stereotypes . . . and their illusion of control,
which makes for over-optimistic estimates of outcomes that are a matter of chance or luck . . . .2 20

In another recent review of the evidence, Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein stated:
[R]esearch provides dramatic support· for Simon's concept of bounded
rationality. The experimental results indicate that people systematically violate the principles of rational decision making when judging
probabilities, making predictions, or otherwise attempting to cope with
probabilistic tasks. Frequently, these violations can be traced to the
use of judgmental heuristics or simplification strategies. These heuristics may be valid in some circumstances but in others they lead to biases that are large, persistent, and serious in their implications for
decision making.
Much evidence suggests that the laboratory results will generalize.
Cognitive limitations appear to pervade a wide variety of tasks in
which intelligent individuals serve as decision makers, often under
conditions that maximize motivation and involvement.221

Another authority recently encapsuled the evidence in dramatic
fashion. "[O]ur cognitive capacities have obviously evolved in a less
complex environment than we presently inhabit."222
219. Tversky and Kahneman summarize the recent evidence as follows:
Although the statistically sophisticated avoid elementary errors . . . their intuitive judgments are liable to similar fallacies in more intricate and less transparent problems.
. . • What is perhaps surprising is the failure of people to infer from lifelong experience • . . fundamental statistical rules . . . .
. . . [P]eople usually do not detect the biases in their judgments of probability.
Id at 1130. But see Einhorn & Hogarth, Behavioral Decision Theory: Processes of Judgment
and Choice, 32 ANN. REv. PSYCH. 53 (1981) (review of the literature, noting some dissent from
the dominant Tversky & Kahneman view; Cohen is the most prominent dissenter).
220. I. JANIS & L. MANN, supra note 160, at 16. See A. GEORGE, PRESIDENTIAL DEC!•
SIONMAKING IN FOREIGN POLICY 19 (1980); Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERS. &
Soc. PSYCH 311 (1975).
221. Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Cognitive Processes and Societal Risk Taking, in
COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 165, 169, 173 (1976).
222. Greene, Social Perception as Problem Solving, in COGNITION AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
155, 161 (1976).
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Fortunately, the evidence to date does not prove that an individual makes the same systematic errors as most other individuals or
that an individual repeats the same systematic errors all or most of
the time. All that can reasonably be inferred from the evidence is
that corporations are safer committing major business decisions to
an intelligent peer group than to any intelligent individual.

B. Strategic and Stark-Choice .Decisions
There is another dimension to·be considered when allocating decision-making authority between the board and the chief executive:
Decision-making under risk and uncertainty involves a choice
among strategies. According to various decision theories, the decision-maker assigns a value to each possible outcome of a particular
decision and judges the corresponding probability that each outcome
will occur. A weighted average formula composed of the values and
probabilities223 then enables the decision-maker to decide whether to
act or to gather further information (at further cost) that may change
the probabilities previously assigned to each outcome.
This :first step recognizes, albeit in a formal manner, that practical decision-making under uncertainty involves subjective judgments. The next step reveals the biases or "strategies" of the
decision-maker. A complex decision problem permits a number of
possible values or "payoffs" for each strategy, depending on conditions that the decision-maker cannot control. Analysis of strategies
can be visualized by creating a "payoff matrix."
Assume the simplest case - only two possible selections, heavy
investment in plant and equipment (S 1) versus no investment (S2),
and only one condition beyond our control, the state of the general
economy, expressed as extremes: depression (N 1) versus prosperity
(N2). Assume N 1 and N 2 are equally probable.224 The decisionmaker has estimated the payoffs, expressed as whole numbers. The
payoff matrix looks like this:
223. The expected value of an outcome, symbolized as E(X), is a weighted average of the
values of the various outcomes, X 1, X 2, • •• , Xi,, and is expressed by the formula:
E(X) = P 1X1 + P2X2 + .•• +PnXn
where P represents the probability and X represents the reward or value of the outcome. P 1 +
P2 + .•. + Pn = l. Spen~r,Adminstrative Science, in MANAGEMENT OF THE URBAN CRISIS
261, 280 (1971).
224. This assumption simplifies the succeeding analysis. In the real world, the decisionmaker will weight the probabilities that N I and N 2 will occur, and this will be reflected in the
numbers in the succeeding matri=.
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This will unmask the strategic bias of the decision maker, which is
rarely articulated in individual decision-making. Some urge theselection of S1 because it maximizes the average payoff (6) over the S2
payoff (5). 225 Others urge S2 because it assures that the worst payoff
we can get is four if a depression occurs.226 This is a "pessimistic" or
"maxim.in" strategy. The decision maker seeks to maximize the minimum possible payoff. Still others urge S1 b~cause it minimizes "regret."227 Regret is the difference between the actual payoff received
and the payoff that would have been received had we known in advance whether depression or prosperity would occur. S1 minimizes
our regret (-2) as contrasted with S2 (-4).
This rather formal analysis serves merely to dramatize the subjectivity involved in assessing probabilities, determining "payoff''
values, and making the final decision. 228 Actually there is a blurred
subjective relationship among the three seemingly separate steps.
Decision-makers introduce an upward bias when estimating the
probability of a highly valued outcome occurring under their preferred strategy.229
Forcing the decision-maker to articulate these critical subjective
matters before making a decision should lead to higher quality decisions.230 The peer group setting of the boardroom will produce this
result. But delegating major decisions to the chief executive alone or
in consultation with subordinates may not lead to articulation of
their strategic choices, and, in any event, such choices may be unduly
biased toward the short-term results that determine their level of
compensation.
225. See P. LAPLACE, A PHILOSOPHICAL EssAY ON PROBABILITIES 20-21 (6th ed. 1951).
226. See A. WALD, STATISTICAL DECISION FUNCTIONS 8 (1950).
227. See L. SAVAGE, THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS 163-64 (1954).
228. See Comath, Prescriptive Versus IJescriptive IJecfsion Theory: Where Might the Twain
Meet? in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 97, 100; A. GEORGE, supra note 220, at 38-39
('bolstering'). See generally H. RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
229. See A. GEORGE, supra note 220, at 38.
230. See Brant, IJerivation of Subject Probabilities to Aid in the IJecision Processes in IJefance Weapons Acquisition, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 162, 168. At the lower
levels, the individual decision-maker can be forced to make the process explicit by using a
"strawman." The strawman articulates the decision process and the decision-maker critiques
the strawman. Id
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Neither the formal decision matrix nor the various strategies employed in decision analysis fully capture the business decisionmaker's usual emphasis on avoiding an alternative that may lead to
failure and the corresponding neglect of potentially good alternatives.231 And the decider may not perceive strategies as independent
of each other. In short:
[The decision maker] is concerned with partial commitment . . . trying
to reduce uncertainties as he goes along until he makes the final decision. . . . He would like to know what he has to pay to keep options
open, what he has to pay to delay final commitment. . . . The decision is not so much disappearing; perhaps, as le~s definite than analysts
make it seem.232
Long-range and other overall corporate planning require the corporation to select a strategy explicitly and knowingly. Given the importance of long-range and strategic planning and the relative lack
of time and informational constraints imposed by the organization
itself on such decisions, the board, and not the chief executive,
should make these decisions. The payoff matrix also emphasizes the
desirability of peer group decision-making by the new board when
any major decision, short- or long-term, involves stark or "all-ornone" choices. Only time constraints will limit the board in this
area.

C.

Corporate Projects and Budget Allocation Among the Divisions

According to the organizational experts, strategic planning, sponsorship of major projects, and·the annual corporate budgeting·process are more akin today to politics than to optimal economic
decision-making. The various divisions or "subunits" of the corporation engage in a species of coalition bargaining with their counterparts before bringing proposals to their superiors. Individuals
campaign for "pet projects,"233 and the chief executive in the large
23 l. The avoidance of the bad alternatives is a Type I error in statistics; the relative neglect
of potentially good alternatives is a Type II error.
232. JJiscussion -Prescriptive and JJescripiive Choice, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208,
at 113, 114 (remarks of G.D. Kaye).
A summary of some of the empirical evidence as to what decision-makers actually do is
contained in Barron, An Information Processing Methodology far Inquiring into JJecision
Processes, in WHITE & BOWEN, supra note 208, at 195. For example, individuals quite often
make the decision with the higher probability of winning rather than the decision with the
higher winning payoff. Id at 202.
233. See Stagner, Corporate JJecision Making: An Empirical Study, 53 J. APPLIED PSYCH. l
(1969). Not only do departmental heads seek to gain support for their "pet projects" but they
also tend to perceive pro~lems from the point of view of their specific department. See Dearborn & Simon, Selective Perception: A Note on the Departmental Identtftcations ofExecutives,
21 SOCIOMETRY ·140 (1958).
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divisionalized firm "tends to ratify strategic investment proposals developed by managers heading operating units throughout the
fum." 234 In the words of Professor Coffee, "operations make policy"
in these firms. 235
If the chief executive cannot modify these powerful organizational dynamics, then perhaps the board cannot do so either. But the
independent board can at least assess these proposals from a more
objective viewpoint, separating to some extent the personalities from
the proposals. Two distinguished organizational scholars have
stated that "[t]he strategic planning process would be far more effective if the proposed actions could be divorced from individual sponsorship."236 Based on the previously discussed evidence, the new
board or an independent committee thereof could improve upon
what "little" decision-making the chief executive makes in these
areas.
D. Organizational Constraints on Decision-Making at the Top
As the previous secti~n indicated, the complex organization
solves many problems involving uncertainty by forcing decisionmaking downward to the specialists or unit closest to the scene.
Each unit deals with the slice of the complex environment that the
corporation has assigned to it and programs everything else out. The
specialists "hedge" by making a decision with foreseeable short-term
consequences. This permits fine-tuning from time to time based on
continuous feedback. Decisions are made only when a problem
arises, and the responses are usually highly programmed. The need
to act quickly requires that the decision be made at the lowest practicable organizational level. As experts in "the art of muddling
through"237 and "satisficing,"238 the affected parties form a coalition
and adopt the first solution to meet the minimum level of acceptability. The various and changing coalitions bent on solving today's
pressing problems subtly and slowly dilute, multiply, or postpone the
corporation's goals, and only those decisions that vitally affect the
entire organization, such as annual budgets, reward systems, and increasing or decreasing the size of the organization, filter up to the
234. Kinnunen, Hypotheses Relatedto Strategy Fonnulation in Large Divlsionalized Compa•
nies, AcAD. MOT. R.E.v., Oct. 1976, at 7, 7.
235. Coffee, Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View ofCorporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1129-30 (1977).
236. Cohen & Cyert, Strategy: Fonnulation, Implementation, and Monitoring, 46 J. Bus.
349, 361 (1973).
237. Seeid
238. See note 43 supra.
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top.239 These constraints on decision-making at the top apply
equally to the chief executive and the board. It is only those major
decisions that the chief executive makes or is organizationally able to
make that can form the basis for any allocation of decision-making
between the chief executive and the board.
Even those matters that filter to the top for decision suffer from
"upward information distortion." According to Professor Coffee,
"some corporations have today between twelve and fifteen hierarchical .levels between the first-line supervisor and the company president, suggesting that much 'noise' and only a very diluted message
will reach the top through regular lines of communication."240 This
obviously imposes severe informational constraints on the chief executive. But the chief executive should not introduce any further significant distortion when he transmits this information to his or her
peers on the new board in the decision areas that the board takes
over.
As the Business Roundtable recently observed: "Cutting across
all these board functions is the board's responsibility to establish in
conjunction with the chief executive officer and his operating and
staff colleagues, systems and procedures to assure that there is a flow
of information to the board sufficient to permit the effective discharge of its obligations."241 This may be easier said than done.
Lawler and Rhode noted that "managers who are not involved in
setting up information and control systems often don't have the expertise to interpret them and thus all they can do is rubber stamp the
decisions of those who have the knowledge." 242 And, the board will
have to protect itself against informational "overload," which may
be as bad as or worse than too little information. As experienced
businesspersons, however, most directors should be able to handle
the "overload" problem effectively.243
E. The Role of the Law in Allocating JJecision-Making Between the
Chief Executive and the Board
The legal model of the corporation traditionally required that the
board "manage" the business, make business decisions, and hire and
239. See id; Van de Ven, A Panel Study on the l!ffects ofTask Uncertainty, Interdependence
and Size on Unit JJecision Making, 8 ORGANIZATION & AD. SCI. 237, 239, 244 (1977).
240. Coffee, Sllpra note 235, at 1138 (footnote omitted).
241. Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Boards of JJirectors of the
Large Publicly-Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2103 (1978).
242. E. LAWLER & J. RHODE, INFORMATION AND CONTROL IN ORGANIZATIONS 140
(1976).
243. See Coffee, S11pra note 235, at 1139, 1145.
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fire the officers. Recently, the model has been modified by statute in
many states to permit the officers ''under the direction" of the board
to manage the corporation's business.244 The modification recognizes that directors do not have the time to manage and that the chief
executive or his subordinates make most major business decisions. 245
Under these statutes, the courts can and should require the new
board to "direct" in a sense quite different from the "monitoring"
model, but involving far less work than the old (and fictional) "managing" model.
Under the "monitoring" model the directors are to monitor the
"performance" of the chief executive. If this requires only a review
of the financial statements, and a continuous grading of the chief
executive's intellect and ability, the director's job would be demeaning and unacceptable to most truly independent, highly motivated,
and capable persons. And the cost in total compensation to those
persons who accepted might outweigh the benefits to the corporation. The financial reports are for all to see, and this kind of corporate "performance" is closely monitored today by the stock market.
The only difference between monitoring by the stock market and the
independent board is that the latter can fire or discipline the chief
executive more quickly. This difference is important - the primary
rationale for the monitoring model. But the instances in which the
new board considers the guillotine are relatively rare, although undoubtedly more frequent than when the chief executive dominated
the board.
The persons who would accept a "monitoring" job as so defined
would do so for the ''wrong" reasons - pay and prestige for little or
no work. A "one hand washes the other'' ethic would spread such
directors on a subtle reciprocal basis across the Fortune 500 and beyond. Many persons undoubtedly believe that this is the reality today. Of optimistic bent, this author would assert that the honest,
conscientious, and successful people on the new board - the
"achievers" with a strong sense of personal worth - would rather do
something meaningful with the time they have committed to devote
to the role. 246
244. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 14l(a) (Supp. 1980);
note 94, at. 140, 193.
245. See

w. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra

w. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 193.

246. See generally R. MUELLER, supra note 171; D. McCLELLAND, supra note 60. The
predominant reason given by prospective outside directors for declining an invitation to serve
was "the time commitment involved." KoRN/FERRY 1981, supra note 6, at 8, 21.
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Professor Eisenberg, however, has proposed a more tantalizing
job description for the "monitoring" director:
Under a monitoring model, . . . the role of the board is to hold the
executives accountable for adequate results (wll.ether financial, social,
or both), while the role of the executives is to determine how to achieve
such results. Of course, the board cannot perform this function without regard to policy: objecµv~s must be set, explicitly or implicitly,
against which to measure management's results, and the selection of
objectives will partly depend on the directors' broad notions of
policy . . . .
The monitoring model, moreover, is not simply mechanistic; monitoring must begin with results, but it cannot end there. . . . The concept of monitoring for results . . . does not preclude the monitors from
going behind the result and either accepting as satisfactory a level of
performance which falls short of the applicable objective, or criticizing
as unsatisfactory a level of performance which exceeds it. What the
concept of monitoring does require is the availability of sophisticated
and independent information-gathering systems . . . and directors
who are equally sophisticated in interpreting both financial and nonfinancial data.247

If the directors are to fix financial objectives, go "behind results,"
and plug into sophisticated and independent information-gathering
systems in their role as monitors, then they will work quite hard. But
not at what they do best.
Some proponents of the monitoring model also have in mind the
prevention of illegal corporate acts through directorial diligence. Although preventing illegal acts is an important goal, Professor Coffee
has ably demonstrated that the organizational obstacles to uncovering these handiworks, largely of middle management, are awesome.
It is one thing to make the obvious statement that independent directors must be adequately informed so as to be able to exercise their
judgment, and another to place upon them the duty of reasonable
diligence or ordinary care to ferret out information. If the latter is a
correct summary of present law, then strong disincentives to service
by truly independent directors exist. Firmly placing such a monitoring duty on the independent directors would require them to devote
part of their time to developing sophisticated and independent information-gathering systems, a task at which they are not especially
adept, to the detriment of the task at which they excel - making
business decisions. Put to choices in the real world of time constraints, directors should be decision-makers not detectives. 248
247. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 165-66 (1976) (footnote
omitted).
248. This is not to suggest that monitoring for illegality, a function loosely assigned today
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The difference between the independent directors acting as "deciders" or as "monitors" is one of degree. Both contemplate firing
the chief executive when necessary. Both contemplate setting policies and objectives. Both contemplate perceptive evaluation of information, but they skew at a critical point: Should the independent
directors spend most of their time gathering information or making
business decisions? Directors should devote their available time to
what the evidence shows they do best - making business decisions.
Courts should require them to do this, within the limits of their time
commitment as directors, and then protect them to the hilt. The
monitoring movement has brought us the new board, but we should
now seek to capitalize on the new situation. The law cannot offer
strong protection to the independent directors for the business decision itself, but only uncertainty as to the information existing in the
very large and complex organization that may later be held to have
been quite relevant thereto. Ordinary negligence liability cannot be
any part of a realistic formula for attracting independent directors,
whether as monitors or deciders. And, requiring plaintiff to prove
that the director's "negligent" inattentiveness caused the loss, as in
.Barnes,249 is insufficient protection for the new board, now controlled by the independents. There is still room for director liability
for utter and reckless disregard of the duty to be informed.
If the courts accept the "decider'' model, the chief executive will
make fewer business decisions. What can the chief executive constructively do with the time that he might then have available for
other tasks? The very things that some proponents of the monitoring
model have suggested for the new board. Specifically, the chief executive should exercise due diligence in gathering accurate information
about corporate activities. The chief must dip down a few levels in
the hierarchy to counteract, to the extent possible, upward information distortion. Monitoring the vast activities of the corporate giant
is a job for the highly compensated chief executive, not the board.
And the courts should require the chief executive to report this more
accurate information to the board, or at least that information critical to business decisions by the new board and any information that
the chief executive obtains regarding illegal activities. In other
words, the legal liability for failure adequately to monitor and report
on corporate activities, legal or illegal, should be squarely placed on
the chief executive (and upon other res_l)onsible senior executives),
to the audit committee, should be abrogated nor that directors should stick their heads in the
sand.
249. Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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and unambiguously taken off the backs of truly independent board
members.
This tentative equation should increase the incentives for truly
independent persons to serve as directors of large corporations, provided that the rates of directorial compensation are raised to realistic
levels.250 Given the limited time that capable and independent directors can devote, the chief executive will still make most of the
business decisions. But the board should decide and make explicit to
the chief executive those categories of ded.sions that it will generally
make, leaving either the unspecified balance or specified categories
of decisions to the chief executive. Unless patently spurious, this decision should be fully protected under the business judgment rule.
However, the deciding model would not tolerate the "pro forma" or
blanket delegation of all major decisions to the chief exe.cutive, even
though that has apparently sufficed to protect directors under present
law.2s1
The law could promote the directorial decision model by exploiting the present ambiguities in the applicability of the business judgment rule to decisions made by corporate officers as such. Under the
influence of the older legal model that directors "manage," the
courts articulated the business judgment rule in terms of protecting
directors from liability as directors for decisions reached by the
board. In the past, top management comprised a majority of the
board. Since the "board" (or at least a majority thereof) had the
same information that top management had, the courts had no compelling need to encourage top management to convey information to
the board. The officers, in their status as directors, received the protection of the rule for any decision that they chose to make or have
rubber-stamped at the board level. Today, the boards of substantially all the largest corporations consist of a majority of nonmanagement directors. The courts can restrict the business judgment rule to
those decisions that are (1) actually macle at the board level (!.e., by
directors acting as such); (2) explicitly delegated by the board to the
chief executive; and (3) in the overlap or gray area and are made by
the chief executive after meaningful consultation with the board.252
250. See note 41 supra.
251. See Kelly v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 72 (Del. Ch. 1969), a.ffd., 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970); W.
CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 94, at 193, 202.
252. Although the standard corporate texts state that the business judgment rules applies to
officers (as well as directors), there is little case law to support the proposition. See W.
FLETCHER, supra note 54, at § 1032. One Delaware case states this proposition in dicta, Kelly
v. Bell, 254 A.2d 62, 75 (Del. Ch. 1969), a.ffd., 266 A.2d 878 (Del. 1970). In affirming, however,
the Delaware Supreme Court appeared to stress the fact that the officers' decision was ''tacitly
acquiesced in [by the full board] without formal resolution." Another Delaware case, while
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The courts may not have to manipulate the business judgment
rule to impose informational duties upon senior management and
confer informational rights upon the new board. Instead, they can
revitalize the hornbook law of agency as to the relationship between
the board, as principal and employer, and the chief executive, as
agent and employee. Agency law applies not only to the external
acts of the chief executive and others, its most common application,
but also to the corporation's internal affairs. The officers, as agents,
have clear duties to the board, as principal. Seavey's Hornbook on
Agency confirms an agent's duties to convey information to, and to
obey, the principal:
An agent who acquires information relevant to matters within his
province and of which he should know the principal would want to
know, has a duty to reveal it . . . .
... [A]n agent has a duty to act only in accordance with what he
reasonably believes the principal has directed or, if he knew the facts,
would direct the agent to do at the time and place of action. 253

And, the agent must be duly diligent and act with ordinary care.254
The new board could sue the officers in a direct corporate action
for violating their informational and ordinary care duties. Although
the new board is not likely to do so (unless it is prepared to dismiss
the chief executive at the same time), the shareholders could sue the
chief executive and other responsible senior executives derivatively
for a clear violation that caused corporate damage and that the new
board failed to pursue. A pattern of repeated and knowing failure
by the new board to pursue such claims against, or to discipline or to
fire, the chief executive might well constitute "gross negligence plus
more," rendering the board liable.255 This narrow exception aside,
the courts should fully protect the independent directors from shareholders' derivative suits when key officers have violated their informational duties to the board.
Since the key officers of the largest corporations are today's
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"deep pockets," the imposition of this duty upon them, coupled with
the elimination of independent directors as potential contributors to
any damage judgment, should strongly encourage the flow of critical
information to the board. Although fewer defendants will be avail-:
able for paying any judgment, the prime purpose of the stockholder's
derivative suit, as Professors Coffee and Schwartz recently argued,
should be deterrence rather than compensation.256 · And, because
these key officers receive very large compensation payments, the imposition of the duty should not create strong disincentives for able
persons to serve as officers.
These suggestions are not intended to turri corporate decisionmaking topsy turvy. As to the informational duties suggested, the
courts should define information "critical" to major board decisions
narrowly and cautiously to permit today's trends in the corporate
establishment to continue to evolve slowly and intelligently. As to
the suggested allocation of decision-making, many chief executives
will welcome the opportunity to pass the buck to the new bo~rd on
certain stressful decisions, 257 drawing both legal and organizational
comfort from the process. And the new board would not be placed
in the position of having to overrule or criticize the chief executive,
nor will the latter be organizationally embarassed by participating
with peers as a business decision-maker.
·
CONCLUSION

The independent directors are looking, in this new era, for a way
to structure the "interval of time" that they have committed to a task
that, as yet, has no precise job description. Corporate law could be a
powerful influence during this period of flux. The courts should cau-,tiously mold this vast resource of directorial talent, integrity, and
high motivation toward its highest and best use - business decisionmaking.
·
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